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RESOLVING DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR: INDEPENDENT ENFORCEABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
ABSTRACT
Arbitration can be used as an effective dispute resolution tool for claims between
a State, and the corporations and nationals of another State. A given arbitral
procedure can be custom designed for the circumstances. Enforcement of valid
agreements to arbitrate are guaranteed in those States which are signatories to the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. The UNCITRAL Model Law also purports to simplify arbitral
award enforcement. The unprecedented U.N. Security Council military response,
to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait triggered numerous individual claims. In order to
begin settling disputes, the Secretary General proposed a non-exclusive Compensa-
tion Commission to hear most claims, and established a fund to pay successful
claimants. Certain exceptional and pre-invasion claims will not fit neatly into this
procedural framework. An Iraq-World arbitral panel should be established as an
alternate forum to process claims arising out of the Persian Gulf War for claimants
lacking a convenient forum in which to proceed.
INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf War between Iraq and Kuwait presents unprecedented
issues concerning the payment of war reparations.' Some claims will be
processed by the United Nations Compensation Commission ("Commis-
sion").2 Some exceptional claims-very expensive or complex claims-will
1. Iraq's August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait left many thousands of people dead and others
homeless. Many international business transactions were also disrupted. U.N. S.C. Res 686,
U.N. SCOR, Mar. 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 567 (1991) demanded that Iraq "accept in principle" its
duty to pay for damages to Kuwait and third States arising out of the war. For the purposes of
this comment, all claimants against Iraq for the damage incurred by the Persian Gulf War will
be discussed under two general groups. First, claims suitable for the United Nations Compensa-
tion Commission that can be settled by making lump sum payments to States. Such a
Commission was contemplated by then Secretary-General of the United Nations Javier Perez de
Cuellar in his Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council
Resolution 687 May 3, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22559 [hereinafter Secretary's Report]. See infra
notes 41 through 94 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion. The second category
is exceptional claims- very large or complex claims that will need to be processed individually.
For the purposes of this comment, pre-invasion claims will be treated as if they were exceptional
claims. An Iraq-World Arbitral Panel similar in procedure to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is
proposed as a forum to process these large and complex claims. See infra notes 192 through
250 and accompanying text.
2. U.N. S.C. Res 687, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991). In paragraph
18, the Security Council decided "[t]o create a fund to pay compensation for claims .. .and to
establish a Commission that will administer the fund."
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need an entirely different procedure.3 Claims arising before Iraq's August
2, 1990 invasion will also need to be adjudicated in a different forum.' An
arbitration panel similar to the Iran-United States Claims tribunal may be a
proper forum to sort out the exceptional and pre-invasion claims that do not
fit within the compensation framework established by the United Nations.'
The basic premise of this comment is that claims arising out of war could be
best settled through the creation of a binding arbitration panel.
War reparations are those funds paid from the loser of a conflict to the
winner. However, the winner cannot simply gather his booty and take it
home like Napoleon leaving Egypt.6 World leaders are also well advised to
avoid an oppressive winner's justice.7 The world's legal system, by
necessity, is invoked to settle disputes of any magnitude between independent
States.8 Because thousands of claims totalling in the hundreds of billions of
dollars will need to be processed, determining how to pay claims arising out
of the Persian Gulf War is likely to stretch the world's legal system to its
limit and become a "legal nightmare. " '
Overcrowding in the courts of the United States and elsewhere causes
many disputants to turn to arbitration to settle their conflicts as an inex-
3. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, defining exceptional claims as either very expensive or
complex. Deciding exactly how to process claims will be a challenge for many years. For a de-
scription of the mechanism that the Security Council initially approved, see, e.g., Anthony F.
Essaye & Dale C. Turza, Iraq Settlement Claims in Process, NEW YORK L.J., June 6, 1991
(LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File).
4. U.N. S.C. Res. 687 pam. 16, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
"[R]eaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2
August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion
of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result
of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait." Id.
5. To end the hostage crisis of 1979-1980, the United States and Iran entered into an
agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of the two countries severing ties. Iran-United States:
Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal will serve as a model of a functioning dispute resolution panel that may be the
forerunner of an Iraq-World arbitral panel formed to process claims against Iraq arising out of
the Persian Gulf War.
6. Any tour of the Louvre and castles in Paris would reveal the nature of the spoils of war.
Mummies, ancient pottery, gold jewelry and a hieroglyphic inscribed obelisk are all treasures
that the French acquired during their domination of Egypt.
7. The harsh Treaty of Versailles planted the seed for the start of World War II. It has been
suggested, and properly so, that the winners of a conflict write history, Howard Berman,
Lectures on Public International Law, Address at California Western School of Law (Fall 1991).
Steps should be taken to make sure that the peace that is negotiated in the Persian Gulf is stable,
lasting and equitable.
8. Customary international law (including State sovereignty which acts as a bar to unilateral
State prosecutions) is invoked in all dealings between States.
9. Bringing together all the different arbitrators with their different backgrounds will create
many problems. Even deciding on priority of claims will be a challenge. Language barriers
may be a stumbling block. The claims tribunal may end up resembling an "international
lawyers' bazaar." Milan Meeting Addresses Arbitration Issues Emerging From Gulf War, 2
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 101, 102 (Apr. 1991).
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pensive and expeditious alternative to fullblown litigation.1" The settlement
of the current crisis does not compel the conclusion that this situation will be
different. Certainly, arbitration has been employed to settle international
disputes since ancient Greece.1" Ultimately, the effectiveness of internation-
al arbitration will come down to whether or not the losing party will pay.1
Binding arbitration agreements between States often create procedures to
enforce arbitration agreements and decisions. 3 A party that submits its
dispute to binding arbitration should, justifiably, be entitled to some security
when he consents to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator." Multinational
conventions or treaties providing for comity between States can help increase
the chances that an arbitral award will be enforced. The enforcement
provisions of both The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")"3 and The Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration ("Model Law") as done by the
10. Arbitration can be flexible, fast, economical, and respond to parties' distrust of the courts
of another State. Expansion in international trade has brought arbitration back as a viable
alternate dispute resolution technique for many commercial disputes. See, e.g., Jill Pietrowski,
Comment, Enforcing International Cotnnercial Arbitration Agreements-Post-Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REV. 57, 58 (1986).
11. Arbitration was frequently employed to peacefully settle disputes even during the Middle
Ages. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 588 (2d ed. 1987).
See, e.g., JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO
(1929).
12. The question one may ask is whether the arbitral award can be enforced against the losing
party. Arbitral awards are voluntarily complied with in a large number of cases. This may be
connected with the fact that international enforcement measures are available to many winning
parties. Albert Van Den Berg, Recent Enforcement Problems Under the New York and ICSJD
Conventions, 5 ARB. INT'L 2 (1988).
13. A good first step for entering into binding arbitration is to sign an arbitration agreement.
This will trigger the enforcement Conventions that States have ratified. This comment assumes
the signing of a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate between Iraq and the States seeking
reparations for their direct harms and the harms of their nationals. The customary international
law concept of pacta sunt servanda would help insure that the agreement was carried out.
Article 26 of The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doe.
A/Conf. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) states: "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This should apply to an agreement to
arbitrate contained in a peace treaty.
14. Ordinary channels for appeal are not available to the party that consents to binding
arbitration. Recognition and enforcement conventions in force between States limit the channels
of appeal and increase the likelihood that an arbitral award will be enforced. "The goal of the
[New York] Convention, and the principle purpose underlying American adoption and implemen-
tation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate
are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries." Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974).
15. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The subsequent
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as done by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law mirrors the enforcement language of the New York Convention.
The primary differences with respect to enforcement will be highlighted throughout this
comment.
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United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 6
help facilitate this end. 7
This Comment demonstrates that an Iraq-World arbitral panel can work
as an effective tool to settle claims in the aftermath of war. A brief history
of the Persian Gulf War with a special emphasis on the resolutions created
by the United Nations Security Council ("Security Council") in response to
the crisis will create a factual context for the discussion. Other U.N. activity
including the formation of the Compensation Commission will necessarily be
included." Attention will then turn to the enforcement provisions of the
New York Convention and the Model Law and how they can be used to
enforce the decisions of an ad hoc arbitral panel. Congressional Acts and
recent U.S. Court decisions relating to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards will also be examined. Finally, a description of an Iraq-
World arbitral panel based on the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal is proposed as
an effective forum for settling claims not contemplated by the Security
Council when creating the Commission.
I. HISTORY-U.N. RESPONSE TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWArr
The August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought about unprece-
dented international concerted action." The response from the U.N.
Security Council in several resolutions brought about an invasion of Iraq that
liberated Kuwait and reinstated the internationally recognized government of
that State. The Security Council acted on the authority of the U.N. Charter,
first by attempting the peaceful settlement of the dispute,' and then, by
using force.2 The Security Council passed several resolutions concerning
16. U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985)
[hereinafter Model Law].
17. The enforcement and appeal language contained in the New York Convention and the
Model Law is discussed at infra notes 92-190 and accompanying text.
18. U.N. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, Mar. 2, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 568 (1991); U.N. S.C. Res
864, U.N. SCOR, May 20, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991).
19. The U.N. effectively organized a force that defeated one of the ten largest armies in the
world. The effort of the U.N. could be heralding a new era in the area of international law
enforcement. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, U.N. Cease-fire Resolution Brings Revolutionary
Development in International Law, 7 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 151 (Apr. 1991).
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. "The Security Council shall decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." Id.
21. "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain or restore international peace
and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 authorizes the Security Council to use force
since Article 42 reads "[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the
4
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the Persian Gulf War, some of which relate directly to the issue of the
payment of war reparations.
Security Council Resolution 660 condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
and called for their immediate withdrawal from that territory.' The
Security Council determined Iraq had breached international peace and
security which triggered the Council's authority under the U.N. Charter to
decide what measures were necessary to restore peace to the region.' The
Security Council first decided what measures not involving the use of armed
force ought to be implemented in accordance with the U.N. Charter.'
Subsequently, Resolution 661 was enacted imposing comprehensive economic
sanctions against Iraq and establishing a special committee to monitor the
sanctions process.' This committee was the predecessor of the Commis-
sion established in Resolution 687 responsible for administering war repara-
tions.26
Later resolutions27 culminated in the Security Council authorizing the
use of all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the
region. 2  The Security Council decided that the sanctions had been
inadequate and that the use of force provided for in the U.N. Charter was
appropriate." A deadline was set for Iraq to begin their withdrawal from
Kuwait.'
Soon after the January 15, 1991 deadline' passed, a United Nations
coalition force engaged the Iraqis both in Kuwait and in Iraq. During the
conflict, the Security Council passed Resolution 686 which called for Iraq to
"accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage
or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their nationals and
corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by
Iraq."32 This strong language began the lengthy war reparations process to
compensate the States and nationals injured due to the Persian Gulf War.
United Nations."
22. U.N. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, Aug. 2, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
25. U.N. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, Aug. 6, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
26. U.N. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 8, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
27. U.N. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, Aug. 25, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1329 (1990) endorsed a
naval blockade; U.N. S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, Sept. 13, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1330 (1990)
addressed some humanitarian needs; U.N. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, Sept. 16, 1990, 29
I.L.M. 1331 (1990) demanded the release of foreign nationals; U.N. S.C. Res. 670, U.N.
SCOR, Sept. 25, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1334 (1990) reiterated the need for strict compliance with
sanctions; and U.N. S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR, Nov. 28, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1564 (1990)
condemned Iraq's attempt to destroy Kuwait's civil records.
28. U.N. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, Nov. 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990).
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
30. U.N. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, Nov. 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990) gave the
Iraqis until January 15, 1991 to begin their unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
31. Id.
32. U.N. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, Mar. 2, 1991, 29 I.L.M. 568 (1991).
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Due to the war, business was interrupted between Iraq and the rest of the
world as mandated by the Security Council. 3 Resolutions by the Security
Council put many corporations who were doing business with Iraq in breach
of contract. 4 Sanctions aside, many other claims in contract, tort and
property have arisen out of the Persian Gulf War. Thus, the question still
remains: what amount of these war-related liabilities will be apportioned
between the different states and their nationals?
Resolution 687 reaffirmed that Iraq was liable "for any direct loss,
damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural
resources, or the injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corpora-
tions."35 This demand was not to prejudice the already existing Iraqi debt
and obligations that accrued before the August 2, 1990 invasion of Ku-
wait.'4 Resolution 687 also called for the creation of "a fund to pay
compensation for claims . . and to establish a Commission that will
administer the fund.""7 Additionally, Resolution 687 directed the Secretary
General to make a report on how Iraq would contribute to the fund and on
the composition of the Commission that would be necessary for verifying
claims and administering the fund. 8 The Secretary General's Report of
May 2, 1991, created the Governing Council of the Compensation Com-
mission ("Governing Council"). The Governing Council has a duty to sort
out claims and to set the level of Iraqi contribution to the Compensation
Fund." Resolution 692 gave the Governing Council its authority to begin
processing claims.'
I. THE SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSED THE GOVERNING
COUNCIL AND THE COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO PROCESS
CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
The May 2, 1991 Report of the Secretary-General outlined suggestions
for the creation of a non-exclusive Commission to settle disputes arising out
of the Persian Gulf War.4 The Governing Council is comprised of 15
33. U.N. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, Aug. 6, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990).
34. Id. Comprehensive sanctions forcing the end to trade can cynically be viewed as a
breach of contract.
35. U.N. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 8, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
36. Id. Iraq was still liable for any debt it had outstanding before the Kuwait invasion.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Secretary's Report, supra note 1.
40. U.N. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, May 20, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991).
41. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 22. The Report gives a description of one
possible, non-exclusive forum for processing claims. The structure would be a Governing
Council, supported by Commissioners, deciding how to distribute funds from an escrow account.
6
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members-one each from the current members of the Security Council.42
They will be responsible for maintaining the United Nations Compensation
Fund (Fund).' The purpose of the Fund is to pay reparations for losses
arising out of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait in accordance with
Security Council Resolutions 687 and 692." Decisions of the Governing
Council will require the affirmative vote of nine of its members unless the
decision concerns the method of ensuring payment to the fund which requires
a unanimous vote.'
Individual claimants will have limited access to the Commission.' To
expedite the claims procedure, individual claims will only be checked on a
sample basis.47 Further verification will be requested only if the circum-
stances warrant." The Commission will hear the consolidated claims that
governments will bring on their own behalf and on behalf of their corpora-
42. U.N. S.C. Rcs. 692, U.N. SCOR, May 20, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991), "[Djecides to
establish the fund and the Commission . . .in accordance with Section I of the Secretary-
General's report, and that the Governing Council will be located at the United Nation's Office
at Geneva and that the Governing Council may decide whether some of the activities of the
Commission should be carried out elsewhere." Id. The Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para.
I(C)(5) provides that "[Tlhe principal organ of the Commission will be a 15-member Governing
Council composed of the representatives of the Security Council at any given time."
43. Secretary Report, supra note 1, para. I(G)(10). "As the policy-making organ of the
Commission, the Governing Council will have the responsibility for establishing guidelines on
all policy matters, in particular, those relating to the administration and financing of the Fund,
the organization of the work of the Commission and the procedures to be applied to the
processing of claims and to the settlement of disputed claims, as well as to the payments to be
made from the Fund." Id.
44. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. I(A)(3). The fund was established as a special
account of the United Nations. This fund was to be given all the privileges and immunities that
are available under Article 105 of the U.N. Charter.
45. Id. para. I(G)(I). Neither will a veto apply to any of the decisions of the Governing
Council. If consensus is required for a particular decision and not attained, the matter will be
referred to the Security Council on the request of any one member of the Governing Council.
See, e.g., Chris Whaling, Note, Enforcement Against Crimes of Aggression, 7 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 325 (Aug. 1991).
46. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 21. "It is recommended that the Commission
should entertain, as a general rule, only consolidated claims filed by individual Governments on
their own behalf or on the behalf of their nationals and corporations." Id. Each State will
aggregate claims and submit them on a consolidated basis. Reparations will be made in lump-
sum settlements and each State will be responsible for distributing the proper amount to its
citizens. See, e.g., Essaye & Turza, supra note 3.
47. The Governing Council will only check some random sample of each claim package
presented by a State for their consideration. Most claims will not receive individual attention.
It seems as if the onus has been placed on States to eliminate frivolous claims before presenting
them to the Compensation Commission. This process seeks to insure that the most urgent claims
based on personal losses due to the invasion will be processed quickly. See, e.g, Whaling,
supra note 45, at 325.
48. The Commissioners are empowered to call expert witnesses or request more evidence if
they need it to determine the validity of a claim. Otherwise they will merely verify that the loss
was within the meaning of paragraph 16 of Resolution 687-a direct result of Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Iraq. If the claim meets this threshold, it can then be passed to the
Governing Council for final approval and distribution of funds. Secretary's Report, supra note
1, paras. 25-26.
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tions and nationals.49 The Commission will then recommend, and the
Governing Council will decide, the total amount of available funds to be
allocated to each government "[taking into account the size of the claims,
the scope of the losses sustained by the country concerned and any other
relevant factors."'
Individual governments will determine the procedures for consolidating
claims. The role of the individual claimant may only relate to the
registration, verification and evaluation of the claims.52 Claims will be
assessed by the Commission which will submit them to a panel consisting of
three commissioners for verification and evaluation. 3 These commissioners
may request additional evidence or hold hearings to determine the merit of
each claim or they may make recommendations that will be final and subject
only to the Governing Council's approval.' Only during the verification
and evaluation stage will individual claimants be called upon to present new
evidence. 5 Payments awarded by the Commission go to the government
of the state who is then responsible for distributing the funds to the individual
and corporate claimants.'
The Commission will employ a different mechanism to handle various
claims. The Secretary's Report suggested categorizing claims by type and
49. It will be for each individual Government to decide on the procedures to be followed
internally with respect to the consolidation of the claims. Each State will take into account its
own legal system, practice and procedures. Secretary's Repoli, supra note 1, para. 21.
50. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 28. The Report goes on to say that it might be
necessary to create a separate category for Kuwait. The occupation of their country, combined
with the bombing of their cities, the advancing coalition troops, and the scorched earth Iraqi
retreat took a disproportionately heavy toll on the Kuwaitis. Their losses have been estimated
to be in the neighborhood of $100 billion. The rest of the world also has claims that may
surpass that total. Essaye & Turza, supra note 3.
51. The Secretary's Report alludes to the possibility of creating categorizations for the filing
of consolidated claims. The report suggests dividing losses by size or by a public versus private
distinction. The Governing Council is given wide discretion to decide all the formal
requirements for the presentation of a claim. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, paras. 23-24.
52. "The filing of individual claims would entail tens of thousands of claims to be processed
by the Commission, a task that could take a decade or more and could lead to inequalities in the
filing of claims disadvantaging small claimants." Id. para. 21. The process is going to take
several decades to complete anyway, since that is how long it will take for Iraq to come up with
the necessary funds to pay claims.
53. Id. para. 26. Once it is established that the formal requirements have been met, the
claim will be to a verification and evaluation panel. Such panels are "[niormally comprised of
three commissioners for this purpose." Id.
54. Id. Of course, the Governing Council should have the power to decide whether or not
the award is warranted. They should be able to return claims to the Commissioners for further
review if they desire.
55. Id. At this stage in the proceeding, Iraq will be informed of all the claims against it and
will have the right to present its comments to the Commissioners. The Report also recommends
that the Governing Council decide if the claimant State needs assistance to ensure adequate
representation.
56. Id. para. 28. Should payments be made in full or should percentages be paid? What is
the effect of outstanding obligations from early judgments on later claimants? Will individual
States be free to negotiate cents on the dollar agreements with their nationals in order to satisfy
that individual?
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size.517 Distinguishing between losses incurred by governments and losses
incurred by corporations and nationals might also be useful to expedite the
claims process.58 Priority consideration may be granted to small claims
relating to loss of life and personal injury." Certain urgent claimants may
have access to an expedited process requiring minimal evidentiary proof.'
Some claims should be easier to process due to simplicity in documentation
as compared to claims with complex legal questions involving multiple
parties.6" Regardless of the size of the controversy, all successful claimants
will be vying for the same limited Iraqi oil profits for decades.62
One downside of expediting small claims is that it practically guarantees
that the limited available funds will be completely depleted before the larger
claimants have prepared their cases.' Many of these claims will be in the
exceptional category." A mechanism for resupplying the fund is currently
under consideration. The Secretary's Report suggests several ways to ensure
Iraqi payments into the fund including, but not limited to, taking a percent-
age of Iraqi oil profits and creating an escrow fund into which Iraq will
57. Id. para. 23. For example, claims of personal injury or wrongful death, are distinguish-
able from claims for property damage, environmental damage or damage due to the depletion
of natural resources. The claim could be any size.
58. Id.
59. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 24. The Secretary General believed there was
.some merit in providing for a priority consideration of small claims relating to the losses of
individuals so that these are disposed of before the consideration of claims relating to losses by
foreign Governments and by corporations." Id.
60. Whaling, supra note 45, at 326-27. Some proposed urgent claims are those seeking a
one-time payment as the result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait who either a) departed from Iraq
between August 2, 1991 and March 2, 1991; b) were seriously injured; or c) whose children,
spouses or parents died. These claims could be further divided into claimants who will settle
for $2500 and those seeking up to $100,000. The amount of documentary proof for these
claimants will adjust according to the size of the claim. Id.
61. Not much more than a death certificate or hospital bills should be required of claimants
seeking compensation for wrongful death or personal injury. After a claim is verified, the
successful claimant then waits for a pro rata share of a lump-sum payment coming to her State.
For major international business transactions the required documentation may not be as clear-cut.
Attorneys would almost certainly present large claims to the Commission in order to make sure
that the rights of the parties were protected.
62. Whaling, supra note 45, at 328. If Iraq owes $180 billion dollars in total pre-war and
post war debt, and if $7 billion is acquired each year by attaching 30 percent of Iraqi oil profits
(if Iraq returns to pre-war export levels) after paying anticipated administrative costs, it will take
approximately 30 years before the funds are available to pay the final award. Id.
63. Whaling, supra note 45, at 327. Claims with complicated documentation will take longer
to assemble. Also, if there is a dispute over whether or not the loss has occurred, an evidentiary
threshold may appear that will also slow down the claims process. If funds are distributed on
a first settled, first paid basis, successful claimants will need to wait until Iraq has placed more
money in the escrow fund established in the Secretary's Report.
64. Since exceptional claims are, by definition, the very large and complex claims it follows
that it will take longer for the individual claimant to assemble a case. It makes sense that
claimants would want to spend more time and resources pursuing a claim worth many millions
of dollars rather than if the claim were worth thousands of dollars.
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deposit funds.'
Controlling trade with Iraq will be essential to ensure that funds are
available to pay successful claimants.' The capacity of a fund to pay
claimants is one measure of the success of a dispute resolution technique.67
Monitoring the exports of Iraq is the Commission's duty most relevant to the
issue of enforcing arbitral awards since some percentage of Iraqi oil exports
will finance the Fund." Although the embargo placed on Iraq at the start
of the Persian Gulf War has since been eased to allow the Iraqis to purchase
medicine, food and other non-military goods,' eventually the Iraqis will be
able to increase their oil exports to pre-war levels when a compensation
mechanism has been set in place.' In addition to the role of watchdog of
Iraqi trade, the Commission and its Governing Council will take an active
role in gathering funds and processing claims against Iraq.71
It is estimated that over 10,000 claims will need to be processed due to
the Persian Gulf War, including many pre-invasion and exceptional
claims.' Some claimants who wish to attach some particular Iraqi frozen
assets may choose not proceed before the Commission.' To bring all such
65. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 17. The report suggests the following as a means
for ensuring Iraqi payment into the Fund: payment of a fixed percentage of market value of
petroleum exports, transferring actual petroleum to the Commission for sale on the open market,
establishment of an escrow fund to take lump sum periodic payments, taking a percentage of
titles of documents issued in favor of Iraq and depositing the proceeds in an escrow fund.
66. Id. par. 16. The Report determined that the Security Council did not intend that Iraqi
foreign "frozen assets" would be used to finance the Fund. All U.N. plans to finance awards
create a model based on contribution into an account by Iraq of money gained through
exportation of oil.
67. Id. para. 14. "The arrangements for ensuring payments to the Fund are among the most
technical and difficult of the tasks that have been entrusted to the Commission. The decisions
taken in this regard will determine, inter alia, the financial viability of the Fund and its capacity
to meet the compensation claims decided upon [by] [sic] the Commission as well as the size and
organization of the secretariat." Id.
68. id. par. 18. "All of these methods [of the payments into the fund] presuppose
cooperation by Iraq and strict supervision of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products
from Iraq. To this end, the Commission should arrange for appropriate monitoring. Whatever
approach is adopted, should Iraq fail to meet its payment obligation, the Governing Council
would report the matter to the Security Council." Id.
69. U.N. S.C. Res. 687 par. 20, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991). The
Security Council decided to modify an earlier prohibition against financial transactions with Iraq
to allow trade of foodstuffs and supplies for essential civilian needs in addition to medicine and
other health supplies which Iraq had already been permitted to purchase.
70. Secretary's Report, supra note I, par. 19. The Secretary-General did recognize the
possibility that it would be some time before the Iraqis were able to resume oil exports to pre-
war levels.
71. The respective roles of the Governing Council and the Commission in processing claims,
as suggested by the Secretary's Report, appears supra notes 41-70 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Essaye & Turza, supra note 3.
73. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, pama. 22. The Report addresses the issue of whether
or not the Commission is an exclusive claims procedure forum. The pre-invasion claims which
needed to be addressed "through the normal mechanisms" answered the Secretary-General's
question. The Report went on to say that Resolution 687 could not establish the Commission
as an organ with exclusive competence to consider claims arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion
and occupation of Kuwait.
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claims into the various courts of the States involved would be overly
burdensome on these States' respective legal systems. For example, getting
listed on full dockets in the United States' courts would require years for
some claimants before they stepped into an effective existing forum. This
would also assume that Iraq would accept the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts
which is certainly not guaranteed. 74 If U.S. nationals were forced to
proceed against Iraq on an individual basis, only the wealthier plaintiffs
would likely be able to afford and receive their day in court.
Some claimants with pre-invasion or exceptional claims may need to
proceed through the normal channels of their country's legal system. 75
Creating an Iraq-World arbitral panel, though not a normal channel, could
effectively administer some claims for parties who were somehow precluded
from proceeding before the Commission and wanted to keep the matter out
of their domestic courts.76 In light of the similar circumstances often
surrounding these claims, a permanent arbitral panel could facilitate the
claims settlement process. Such a panel would assist in decreasing the time
and monetary expenses involved in settling claims. A panel of arbitrators
which is already aware of the factual circumstances common to all of the
Persian Gulf War claims would also diminish the effort ordinarily required
in the discovery process. Points common to all claims would not need to be
treated anew with each claim. Thus the panel could more quickly direct their
attention to issues which distinguish a particular claim from all others. Any
such savings in time and effort can translate into lower costs for all involved
in processing these claims.
Regardless of the eventual procedure adopted, claims need to be
identified now while documents are still intact, witnesses are still alive and
before claims grow stale. The Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) will
play a major role to that end with respect to claims held by U.S. citizens
against Iraq. U.S. claimants are required to register their complaints with
OFAC.' This governmental agency, integral in the seizure of Iraqi foreign
assets located in the U.S., will also have a role in administering those assets.
Similar bodies in other States also fill this function or can be created to
watch Iraqi assets located within their country and to compile the claims of
74. Questions of sovereign immunity are certainly germane to the discussion of this comment,
but outside its scope.
75. U.N. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991). See Essaye &
Turza, supra note 3. Some claimants may seek recourse in their respective national forums.
Private arbitration or mediation also count as more normal channels.
76. The difficulty of enforcing a court decision against an unwilling litigant with no in remjurisdiction is one reason for not wanting to proceed unilaterally in one's own domestic forum.
77. Every U.S. citizen with a claim against Iraq that arose prior to January 16, 1991, was
required to register their complaint. To achieve this end, OFAC developed Form TDF 90-22.41
complete with instructions for use in reporting information on claims. John Gerald Jr., Pursuing
Claims Against Iraq: Available Options, 14 MIDDLE E. EXECUTIVE REP., LTD. 9 (June 1991)
(LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current file).
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that State against Iraq.7'
All U.S. nationals with an outstanding claim against Iraq as of January
16, 1991, were required to complete a report concerning that claim and file
it with OFAC." This action was mandated by the Iraqi Sanctions Regula-
tions, which provide, among other things, for the carrying out of a census
of claims against Iraq.' The claim may be in relation to losses due to
nationalization, expropriation, or other such logs involving property rights,
compensation for personal injury or death, losses from breach of contract or
default on debts, and any other losses that may be attributable to Iraq or an
entity of the government of Iraq.81 The broad language seems to include
even those claims that may have arisen prior to the August 2, 1990, invasion
of Kuwait by Iraq in contrast to the language of Resolution 674 which spoke
only of injuries "as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation."' This
language was supported by Resolution 687 which states that claims prior to
August 2, 1990, would be "addressed through the normal mechanisms. " '
In reporting a claim, the claimant must provide details relating to himself
and the identification of the Iraqi entity against which the claim is assert-
ed." An estimate of the value of the claim and the circumstances of the
loss must also be included." Outside parties who may have an interest in
the claim should be identified, as well as any alternative source of compensa-
tion available.' Any potential counterclaims on the part of the government
of Iraq should be described." The party making such a report also must
submit a signed good faith certification as to the accuracy and completeness
of the report.3 8 The deadline for reporting claims was finally set at March
15, 1991. ' These initial claims were not formal claims against the
government of Iraq, but were intended to give the Commission information
78. Id. In the United Arab Emirates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federation of
the U.A.E. Chambers of Commerce ar ensuring that officials in the UA.E. are notified of
claims. One chamber has indicated that there is no particular form for reporting a loss, but a
valid report will be signed by the party who suffered the loss, notarized, and accompanied by
copies of available supporting documents. The Kuwait Council of Ministers established the
Central Committee for the Assessment of damages Incurred by Kuwait from the Iraqi Invasion.
This Committee created a claims report form. Id. Since awards paid by the Commission will
be in the form of lump-sum settlements, States will need to find a way to organize claims that
they are submitting for consideration.
79. Id.
80. Id. Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 575 (amended Feb. 11, 1991).
81. Gerald, supra note 77.
82. U.N. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, Oct. 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1560 (1990).
83. U.N. S.C. Res. 687 para. 16, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
84. Gerald, supra note 77.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Though extensions have been granted for a variety of reasons including that the
injured party was unaware of the published deadline.
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that will enable it to establish its own effective claims mechanism.'
As noted, some claims will fall outside the scope of the Commission's
mandate. Two categories of claims-exceptional claims involving complex
issues and large dollar amounts, and pre-invasion claims-need to be handled
through normal mechanisms and are not covered by the language of either
the Secretary's Report or Security Council Resolutions. Establishing an
arbitral panel specifically to hear these types of claims seems appropriate.
An ad hoc or institutional arbitral panel would need to have the force of law
behind it to make it attractive for parties to voluntarily submit their claim to
it. The issue of enforcement would be foremost in the minds of many
claimants. The New York Convention and the Model Law may provide the
key to independent enforcement of claims that would make creating an ad
hoc arbitral tribunal viable.9
III. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND THE MODEL LAW PROVIDE
ENFORCEMENT TO PARTIES ENTERING INTO AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
Enforcement provisions are included in any effective set of arbitral
rules.' The international effect of an arbitral convention could not be that
extreme without the power to enforce decisions rendered pursuant to the
rules of that convention. Both the New York Convention' and the Model
Law' devote a great deal of attention to ensuring comity between states and
their nationals in the enforcement of arbitral awards. The Secretary's Report
specifically mentioned the rules of the Model Law,95 and the rules of the
New York Convention will apply to all its signatory States.'
90. Id.
91. For the purpose of enforcing claims by United States citizens for claims arising out of
the Persian Gulf War, two recognition and enforcement conventions stand out as most relevant.
The New York Convention will apply to agreements to arbitrate entered into by U.S. nationals
as the U.S. is a signatory State to that convention. The Model Law was specifically mentioned
in the Secretary's Report so it will apply, at least to claims processed by the Commission.
92. An arbitral convention that did not include specific enforcement provisions would have
little value, save for domestic use, where enforcement through the courts would be almost
automatic.
93. New York Convention, supra note 15.
94. Model Law, supra note 16.
95. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, pam. 27. "Where a dispute arises out of the allegations
made by a claimant that the Panel of Commissioners, in dealing with its claims, has made an
error, whether on a point of law and procedure or on a point of fact, such disputes will be dealt
with by a board of commissioners who for this purpose should be guided by such guidelines as
have been established by the Governing Council and UNCITRAL." Id. The paragraph goes
on to specifically give the Governing Council the final decision to "modify as necessary" the
UNCITRAL rules.
96. The following States are parties to the New York Convention. A (1) signifies that a
Contracting State made the reciprocity reservation. A (2) signifies the commercial matter
reservation: Australia, Austria (I), Belgium, Benin, Botswana (1-2), Bulgaria (I), Burkina Faso,
Byelorussia (1), Cambodia, Canada (1-2), The Central African Republic (1-2), Chile, Columbia,
Cuba (1-2), Cyprus (1-2), Czechoslovakia (1), Denmark (1-2), Djibouti, Ecuador (1-2), Egypt,
Finland, France (1-2), Germany (1-2), Ghana, Greece (1-2), Guatemala (1-2), Haiti, The Holy
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The United States has been a party to the New York Convention since
1970." Consequently, the U.S. is seized with a duty to recognize and
enforce foreign arbitral awards when the proper procedure is followed."
When adopting the New York Convention, a state is given the opportunity
to take reservations-one on reciprocity and another for limiting the
Convention's effectiveness to commercial disputes." The U.S. availed
itself of both reservations when it ratified the New York Convention."°°
The first reservation of the New York Convention, the reciprocity
reservation, would require a State to recognize and enforce only those awards
rendered in another Contracting State.'0' Thus, if the arbitration panel is
established in a Contracting State, all other Contracting States would be
required by the New York Convention to recognize and enforce the panel's
awards. Currently, New York is the proposed site for the Commission to
base their operations, with Geneva and Vienna acting as backup loca-
tions."° The United States, Switzerland and Austria are signatory States
See (1-2), Hungary (1-2), India (1-2), Indonesia (1-2), Ireland (1), Israel, Italy, Japan (1),
Jordan, Korea (1-2), Kuwait (1), Luxembourg (I), Madagascar (1-2), Malaysia (1-2), Mexico,
Monaco (1-2), Morocco (1), The Netherlands (1), New Zealand (1), Niger, Nigeria (1-2),
Norway (1), Panama, The People's Republic of China (1-2), The Philippines (1-2), Poland (1-2),
Romania (1-2), San Morino, Singapore (1), South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland (1), Syria, Tanzania (I), Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago (1-2), Tunisia, The Ukraine,
The U.S.S.R. (1), The United Kingdom (1), The United States (1-2), Uruguay and Yugoslavia
(1-2). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 212 (1986).
97. 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1991). "The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States
courts in accordance with this chapter." Id.
98. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 3. "Each Contracting State shall recognize
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following
articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or
charges on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies
than are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." Id.
99. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I sec. 3. "When signing, ratifying or acceding
to this Convention, . . . any State may declare on the basis of reciprocity that it will apply the
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another
Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration." Id.
100. 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West Supp. 1991).
101. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I sec. 3. This means that the arbitral body
must be centered in a Contracting State in order for the award rendered by such a body to enjoy
the full enforcement protection of the New York Convention. A States that did not avail itself
of the reciprocity reservation would be bound to recognize an arbitral award if it was otherwise
valid. States that took the reciprocity reservation would not be treaty bound to recognize and
enforce awards rendered in a State that was not a party to the Convention.
102. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 9. The Secretary General specifically suggested
three places for the center of the Commissions' activity. "For reasons of economy and
practicality, particularly in the secretariat servicing of the Governing Council and the
commissioners, the headquarters of the commission should be in New York. Alternatively, it
might be located at the site of one of the two offices of the United Nations in Europe, i.e.
Geneva or Vienna. The Governing Council may decide whether some of the activities of the
Commission should be carried out elsewhere." Id. Notice the latitude that is available for the
creation of subsidiary dispute resolution forums to supplement the Governing Council.
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to the New York Convention, so enforcement should be automatic even in
States availing themselves of the reciprocity reservation." °o Since the
Model Law was mentioned specifically in the Secretary's Report, it will
automatically be used to help enforce awards."° Award recipients will also
be able to avail themselves of contractually established recognition and
enforcement provisions."°5 Since the signatories of the New York Conven-
tion represent all major countries of the West and all of the Eastern European
countries, the likelihood that Iraq's foreign assets will be found in them is
increased.'" These signatory States account for a very large percentage of
world exports and imports. 0 7
The second reservation of the New York Convention allows a State to
declare that it will "apply the Convention only to differences arising out of
legal relationships ... which are considered as commercial under the
national law of the State making such declaration."-10 The potential for
conflict may arise if States give a narrow interpretation to the word
"commercial." If this were to happen, the range of awards to be enforced by
the New York Convention would be narrowed. Consequently, these claims
would need to be handled under the auspices of the Governing Council
because such claims would be improper for the proposed Iraq-World arbitral
panel due to their lack of independent enforceability.'" A claimant
103. See supra note 96, for a list of signatory States.
104. Secretary's Report, supra note 1, para. 27. The Governing Council has wide discretion
to create its own guidelines and to use the Rules of the Model Law when it needs to settle a
dispute. See supra note 95, for the text of paragraph 27 of the Secretary's Report.
105. If the ideas of the Secretary's Report were turned into a written agreement to arbitrate,
then the Model Law and the New York Convention would apply to the recognition and
enforcement decisions of the body which is created to adjudicate the claims. The Model Law
would apply by reference. The New York Convention would apply by treaty.
106. Ramona Martinez, Comment, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards Under The United Nations Convention of 1958: The "Refusal" Provisions, 24 INT'L
LAW. 487, 493 (1990). Many nations had heavy trade ties to Iraq preceding the Persian Gulf
War. Images of centrifuges capable of manufacturing fissionable material being destroyed aired
on CNN for sometime after the war ended. These centrifuges of Western origin, are a good
example of the extent of the resources that Iraq was able to amass before the invasion of Kuwait.
107. See supra note 96. This is, of course, an understatement. Besides Europe and North
America, all major Pacific Rim trading powers are also Contracting States of the New York
Convention. Since Iraq and some other Middle Eastern countries are not parties to the New
York Convention, one would need to find another basis to justify enforcement in those States
other than duty imposed by a previous treaty. Reference to UNCITRAL in the agreement may
gain access to the foreign assets of Iraq that are located in non-signatory States.
108. The New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I, sec. 3. See supra note 99 for the
actual text. This provision of the New York Convention will require a reviewing court to
determine if the claim is commercial under the laws of the State seeking to enforce the award.
For States not availing themselves of this second reservation, the award can be enforced if the
agreement to arbitrate was valid and no grounds to refuse enforcement have been shown.
109. Actions arising solely out of tort with no issue of prior insurance is an example of a
claim that could not be enforced through the New York Convention by a country taking the
"commercial" reservation of Article I section 3. These claims would be better handled through
the Compensation Commission described by the May 2, 1991, Secretary General's Report, supra
note 1. There would be no conflict if the State where enforcement was sought did not avail
itself of the commercial reservation.
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proceeding before an arbitral body that cannot guarantee some extent of
enforcement, is exposing herself to risk of non-enforcement.'10 Most
States give a broad meaning to the term "commercial" preferring to limit the
arbitrability of the matter under their laws rather than exclude the matter
entirely due to a strict definition of the word "commercial.""' For a State
which did not avail itself of this second reservation, all matters arbitrable
under its laws could be considered, recognized and enforced.
The Model Law takes the reservations of the New York Convention and
incorporates them directly."' The Model Law does not provide the chance
for reservation. The commercial reservation is incorporated directly into the
Model Law which declares that it "[aipplies to international commercial
arbitration.""' The reciprocity reservation is not particularly relevant
since the Model Law theoretically applies to "[any agreement in force
between this State and any other State or States."" 4 The U.N. General
Assembly has recommended applying the Model Law in the settlement of any
international, commercial dispute." 5 Both "international" and "commer-
cial" have special meaning in the context of the Model Law.
The requirement that the arbitration be "international" can be met in a
110. One peril would be if the court in the State where enforcement was sought, refused to
recognize and enforce the arbitral decision. This would be unpleasant if one is trying to attach
particular goods in a State. However, the person who was rejected in one forum would not beprecluded from trying to attach foreign assets in another State. This is true especially if the
award was validly rendered, and the court which refused enforcement did so on arbitrary or
unreasonable grounds, not grounded finnly in international law.
111. See, e.g., Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under
UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 717, 727 (1987). A narrow construction of the term "commercial" would narrow the
application of the New York Convention thus limiting its effectiveness. Most States give an
expansive definition to the realm of "commercial disputes," preferring to preserve the right to
interpret the decision under their laws rather than refusing jurisdiction.
112. Model Law, supra note 16, art. I(I) states under the general heading of scope of
application that "[t]his Law applies to international commercial arbitration subject to any
agreement in force between this State and any other State or States." The reciprocity reservation
really does not apply since the Model Law will apply to any agreement in force between anyStates. The Model Law seems almost to be an attempt by its drafters to rapidly crystalize into
custom the practice of enforcing awards rendered pursuant to a validly made agreement to
arbitrate.
113. Id. The word commercial is an integral element of the Model Law which can be made
less restrictive if a State purposefully gives it a broad meaning.
114. See, e.g., Ungar, supra note I11. On December I1, 1985, the General Assembly
suggested that all member States adopt the Model Law as their domestic law regulating the
conduct of international commercial arbitration. U.N. G.A. Res. 72, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
53, U.N. Doe. A/40/53 (1985).
115. Model Law, supra note 16. On December 15, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly
unanimously recommended "[t]he use of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law in the settlement of disputes arising in the context of international commercial relations,
particularly by reference to the Arbitration Rules in commercial contexts." G.A. Res. 31/98,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 39, at 182, U.N. Doe. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 17, at 57, U.N. Doe. A/31/17 (1976).
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variety of ways." 6 Under the Model Law, if the parties to the arbitration
agreement have their places of business in different States then the arbitration
is international." 7 The arbitration is also deemed international if the place
of arbitration is situated outside the State in which the parties have their
places of business."' If any place where the commercial relationship was
to be performed, or the place where the subject-matter of the dispute is most
closely connected, is outside the State in which the parties have their places
of business, then the arbitration is also found to be international.' 9
Finally, the parties could expressly agree that the subject matter of the
arbitration agreement relates to more than one country.12
The international requirement of the Model Law should be easily met for
processing claims arising out of the Persian Gulf War. Most claims will fall
into the category of claims between parties with places of business in
different States.12 1 In fact, the only claims which would not fit into this
116. Model Law, supra note 16. The definition of "international" with respect to the Model
Law is contained in art. 1(3) which reads:
Article 1. Scope of Application ...
(3) An arbitration is international if:
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of the
agreement, their places of business in different States;
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties
have their places of business:
(i) the place of arbitration of determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration
agreement;
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial
relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter
of the dispute is most closely connected;or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration relates
to more than one country.
117. Id. art. l(3)(a). art. I, sec. 4 modifies art. 1, sec. (3) stating:
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3) of this article:
(a) if a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which has
the closest relationship to the arbitration agreement;
(b) if a party does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to his habitual
residence.
118. Id. art. 1, sec. 3(b)(i). This provision allows an agreement to arbitrate to become
international by virtue of the forum where the disputants have chosen to settle their claim. Thus,
two parties could turn what might have been a domestic dispute into an international one by
choosing to arbitrate in some different State. Such might be the case for parties who bring their
dispute to an established arbitration center, known for its fairness, which happens to be located
outside of their home State.
119. Id. art. 1, sec. 3(b)(ii). This could be a scenario where contractor and sub-contractor
came from the same State and were performing their contract in a second State and the breach
occurs because of events in the second State. Since the place for performance is closely
connected with the dispute, this claim would probably be considered "international" for the
purposes of the Model Law.
120. Id. art. 1, sec. 3(c). This is a catch-all clause. If the parties truly saw some benefit by
bringing their claim under international law, absent an outright fraud, the parties could make it
so by their mutual consent.
121. Most claimants will be proceeding against Iraq for their various tort, contract and
property claims. For now, Iraqi nationals who have no dual citizenship, would be the group
with the most difficulty bringing a claim against Iraq.
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category would be those by parties situated in the same State and the basis
of the dispute also happened in that State. Parties with this sort of claim may
need to proceed in a domestic forum." These parties may still get around
the international requirement if the arbitration panel was located outside their
State, or if the subject-matter of the dispute was located outside their
country. 1
The term commercial as defined by the Model Law is given a very broad
interpretation applying "to all relationships of a commercial nature whether
contractual or not."" The drafters of the Model Law seemingly try to
establish jurisdiction over virtually any type of commercial activity.,'
Further, if a party truly wanted to enforce an arbitral award by invoking the
Model Law, most claimants could creatively construe their claim to fall into
some category of commercial activity. To aid in finding out if an arbitral
tribunal does have jurisdiction, the drafters of the Model Law provided
arbitrators with the jurisdiction to rule on this question. 2
Consent of the parties to arbitration is essential to finalize the agreement.
Written consent to arbitration is necessary for recognition and enforcement
of an award under the New York Convention and the Model Law. 27 The
New York Convention provides that Contracting States shall recognize an
122. This sort of forum shopping is just mentioned as an aside. Parties are certainly free to
pursue claims in their domestic courts or perhaps enter into an agreement to arbitrate. As
mentioned previously, the Commission set up by the Secretary General is non-exclusive.
123. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 1(3) and 3(c). For text of current article, see supra note
116. If parties come to an agreement that their dispute is international, it is more likely than
not that they will find a forum to hear them. Evidencing such an agreement in a writing would
probably satisfy the international requirement of the Model Law.
124. Model Law, supra note 16. But see 24 I.L.M. 1302 which states that "[r]elationships
of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade
transaction for the supply or the exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement;
commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting;
engineering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or
concession; joint venture and other fonus of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of
goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road."
125. Model Law, supra note 16. It is consistent with the plain meaning of the Model Law
and the intent of its drafters to have it apply to as many situations as possible. If an
international event is even remotely commercial (perhaps even because there was an insurance
policy), the Model Law will apply to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral decision
rendered with respect to that event.
126. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 16(1). "The arbitral tribunal may rule on its ownjurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration
agreement." Id. The article goes on to hold that even if the arbitrator finds that no contract
exists, the arbitration clause is not ipso jure invalid.
127. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(1). "Each Contracting State shall recognize
an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration." Model Law, supra note 16, art. 7(2). "The arbitration agreement shall be in
writing." A writing evidencing an agreement to arbitrate is a minimum threshold to trigger
either the New York Convention or the Model Law.
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agreement in writing under which parties undertake to submit to arbitra-
tion.'2 The New York Convention also provides for a stay of court
proceedings in a Contracting State at the request of a party who can show
that his agreement to arbitrate is valid."' Reciprocity reservation aside,
the New York Convention does not expressly mention that both or either
party to the dispute need be nationals of Contracting States to avail
themselves to the enforcement provisions.13° As long as an agreement in
writing exists between the parties going to arbitration, absent a valid defense,
the courts in the States that are signatories of the New York Convention are
bound by treaty to recognize the award or allow the arbitration to pro-
ceed. 1
31
The Model Law declares succinctly that "[tihe arbitration agreement
shall be in writing. "132 A writing can be found in anything from a letter
to the most recent development in telecommunications." The Model Law
provides that an agreement to arbitrate could be found by silence if one was
under a duty to deny that such an agreement had been validly reached."
The Model Law gives broad range to the form of an agreement to arbitrate
which "may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract, or in a
128. New York Convention, supra note 16, art. 2(1). According to art. 2(2), an "agreement
in writing" includes "an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams." This emphasizes that the writing
requirement is not held to a rigid standard. If the New York Convention was drafted today, it
would probably contain a telecommunication catch-all like the Model Law.
129. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(3). "The court of a Contracting State,
when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed." Id.
130. This is important in the Persian Gulf scenario considering that Iraq, the State most
claimants will be proceeding against, is not a signatory of the New York Convention. Although
the Convention would not independently compel Iraq's courts to recognize and enforce awards,
the courts in Contracting States would feel that compulsion.
131. Id. art. 2(1). Valid defenses of the New York Convention are the "refusal" provisions
of Article V. These are discussed in greater detail infra notes 147-91 and accompanying text.
132. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 7(2). The written agreement must be a signed document
"or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which
provide a record of the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim and defen[sle in
which the existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. The
reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration
agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make the clause
part of the contract." Id.
133. Id. The language of the Model Law is sufficiently vague to avoid becoming obsolete
with the invention of each new office gadget.
134. Id. If a written communication contains an allegation that there was an agreement to
arbitrate, then a denial is necessary. Failure to deny could transform the allegation into an
agreement in writing under the Model Law. The individual arbitrator(s) must decide the validity
of the arbitration agreement based on the facts and evidence that they are presented. If a court
is deciding a declaratory judgment action on whether an agreement to arbitrate is valid, the same
kinds of considerations would be examined.
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separate agreement."' 35  The Model Law further provides that "[ain
arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be
recognized as binding."" This highlights a difference with the New York
Convention which only applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
awards.'37 The Model Law seems to have a broader scope than the New
York Convention in that it also applies to enforcement in the state where the
award was rendered. 3 ' However, as we have seen, both the New York
Convention and the Model Law have application in the enforcement of claims
of the proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel. These sets of rules are not
exclusive of each other and can be used in conjunction. Where treaties
agree, both can be applied.' 9
If a large scale arbitral panel was established to process the claims of the
world against Iraq arising out of the Persian Gulf War, the New York
Convention and the Model Law could be employed to aid with enforcement.
Ultimately, whether the center for the arbitration is New York, Geneva,
Vienna or the Hague should not effect whether or not successful claimants
are compensated for their damages. "4 Literally, the New York Convention
applies only to enforcement of awards outside of the State where the award
135. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 7(l). An arbitration agreement "is an agreement by the
parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship whether contractual or not." Id.
Including a dispute resolution clause in any contract is essential, especially for an international
business transaction (or a pre-nuptial agreement). Choice of forum, choice of law, and even
choice of individual arbitrators can be included to avoid jurisdiction difficulties and to commence
the suit soon after the dispute arises.
136. Id. art. 35(1). The award, and by analogy, the agreement to arbitrate are recognized,
if valid, upon application to a competent court.
137. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I(1) provides that it applies to "the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the
State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought." Article I, Section 1
goes on to say that the Convention will "apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought." For the purposes of
arbitral award enforcement provisions, this seems to define foreign as either made in another
territory and not entirely domestic. The New York Convention will apply to those foreign
arbitral awards.
138. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 35(1).
139. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(3), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 63
A.J.I.L. 875, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). When all the parties to the earlier treaty are also parties
to the later treaty, but the treaty is not terminated or suspended . . ., the earlier treaty only
applies to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. New York
Convention, supra note 15, art. 7. "The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect
the validity of multilateral or bilateral agreement concerning the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any
right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed
by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon."
140. The New York Convention would apply to all the Contracting States if the Arbitration
center is one of the cities mentioned in the Secretary 's Report, supra note 1, para. 9. The
Model Law will apply both by reference and by custom. The drafters of the Model Law seemed
to believe that any valid agreement to arbitrate and any valid arbitral award should be upheld
by the courts. Perhaps a duty to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards has become an
international custom.
[Vol. 22
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was rendered. 4 Because countries will be required to contribute to the
fund, the arbitral tribunal seems to take on an anational demeanor-not truly
affiliated with any country in particular-as the funds are transferred to the
Commission. 42 The country where the arbitration panel will sit could
easily deposit their funds with the Commission with the intent to withdraw
all or part of their contribution as they win awards." With the funds
located outside of the country in which the arbitral panel sits, such country
could apply for compensation in a manner like any other nation. Though it
seems odd to resort to a legal fiction, there is at least, an enforcement
mechanism available for all states and nationals with claims.
The language used to describe how awards are recognized is nearly
identical in both the New York Convention and the Model Law. The party
seeking enforcement of the arbitral award is required to submit either the
original award or a duly authenticated copy of the award to the proper court
in the country where he is seeking enforcement.'" That party is also
required to have the award translated into the language of the country where
he is seeking enforcement." A United States "court shall confirm the
141. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. l(1). The New York Convention applies "to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought." Id. Literally, the
scenario contemplated by the drafters of the New York Convention is of a person getting a
favorable decision in State A and seeking to enforce it in State B.
142. Despite fears that if an award does not have a nationality, it could not be enforced,
viewing an award as anational may have advantages. Calling an award national allows
arbitrators to interpret the intent of the parties to arrive at the law to use, rather than using
domestic law as a gap-filler for the agreement to arbitrate. The down-side would be that it may
be easier to enforce an award if it was valid under the law of the country where the arbitration
panel sat. Had there been any procedural problems during the proceeding, local rules could
have stepped in. Also, some States are now creating special statutes that cover international
commercial arbitration held in their country which exclude peculiar local norms. David D.
Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
International Dispute Resolution 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 119 (1990).
143. Considering the anational flavor of the arbitral panel itself, to force the country where
the arbitral tribunal sat to send Iraqi assets out of their country, only to retrieve them at a later
date, seems to perpetuate a legal concern of the drafters of the 1958 New York Convention.
Possibly, Article 1, Section 1 was drafted to avoid collusion between domestic arbitrators and
judges who may be called upon for writs of execution. The need to get parties properly on the
way to compensation seems to outweigh these concerns in our context, as most nations are
working for a similar goal of making Iraq pay for their aggression. Still, no matter how much
paternalistic legal systems may try to favor their own nationals, the procedures in the current
conflict will be handled under the auspices of the United Nations.
144. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. IV, sees. 1(a) and 1(b); Model Law, supra
note 15, ch. VIII, art. 35(2). In the words of the Model Law, the party applying for recognition
and enforcement shall supply "the duly authenticated original award or a duly authenticated copy
thereof, and the original arbitration agreement... or a duly certified copy thereof." The words
are similar in the New York Convention.
145. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. IV(2). "If the said award or agreement is
not made in an official language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party
applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these
documents into such language. The translation shall be certified by an official or sworn
translator or by a diplomat or consular agent." Id. In simpler language, the Model Law, supra
note 16, art. 35(2), provides "[ilf the award or agreement is not made in an official language
of this State, the party shall supply a duly certified translation thereof into such language."
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award unless it finds one of the grounds ... specified in the [New York]Convention.""4
The above discussion of what claims can be arbitrated under the New
York Convention and the Model Law establishes the foundation for a
discussion of their actual enforcement provisions. The authors of the Model
Law closely paralleled the language of the New York Convention when
drafting their enforcement provisions. 7  Analysis of the similarities and
differences of the provisions of these two conventions that speak solely to the
issue of enforcement now follows.
IV. GROUNDS FOR REFUSING TO ENFORCE AWARDS UNDER THE MODEL
LAW AND THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
Article V of the New York Convention lists the grounds upon which a
Contracting State may refuse to recognize or enforce an arbitral award which
is otherwise in compliance." Corresponding refusal provisions are
contained in Article 36 of the Model Law. 49 It is worth noting that both
sets of rules use the word "may" when stating the grounds on which a
country can refuse enforcement. By using "may," the drafters of the New
York Convention and the Model Law have given the courts of the State
where recognition is sought, some discretion in deciding whether or not to
enforce a given award." ° Thus, even if a court noted some minor abuse,
146. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). This section provides in whole that
[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award falling under the convention is made, any
party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter
for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration. The
court shall confirm that award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention.
147. The drafters of the Model Law hoped to create a system that would provide for the
"uniform treatment of all awards irrespective of their country of origin." Report of United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 40 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Dec.
A/40/17 (1985), 24 I.L.M. 1314 (1985). The New York Convention provided a generally
satisfactory means of enforcing awards, but not every State has ratified or acceded to the
Convention. To obtain this goal, the New York Convention's recognition and enforcement
mechanisms were nearly reproduced by the corresponding provisions of the Model Law. See,
e.g., Ungar, supra note I11, at 719.
148. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V. Recognition and enforcement may be
"refused" by the courts of a Contracting State only if proof of one or more of the grounds
enumerated in Article V of the New York Convention arc shown to exist. The discussion of
these refusal provisions will be interspersed with discussion of the corresponding provisions of
the Model Law.
149. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36. This is the Article of the Model Law that
corresponds with the refusal provisions Article V of the New York Convention. "Recognition
or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, may be
refused only" if one or more of the defenses enumerated in Article 36 are shown. This same
language that takes away the reciprocity reservation of the New York Convention also defines
the permissive reasons a court can use to refuse to enforce awards.
150. By using "may" in Article V of the New York Convention, supra note 15; Model Law,
supra note 16, art. 36. The drafters gave judges the opportunity to give as much power to the
enforcement conventions as the laws of that State allows.
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it could still enforce the award if they thought the outcome fair. U.S. Courts
have a predisposition towards upholding the validity of arbitral agreements
and their awards.' The refusal provisions of the New York Convention
and the Model Law profess to provide the only ways in which a court may
overturn an otherwise valid arbitral award.152
Incapacity to enter into an arbitration agreement is one way under the
New York Convention that an arbitral award will not be enforced.' 53 If the
agreement to arbitrate was invalid under the law the parties have subjected
themselves, then a State may also refuse to enforce the award.' Like-
wise, if the award is not valid under the law of the country where the
arbitration took place, then States may refuse to enforce the award. 55 This
first refusal provision renders an award unenforceable if there was not a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties. To date, the invalidity defense has
not been raised in litigation in an American court.1'
The Model Law also authorizes refusal on the grounds of incapacity or
invalidity under the choice of law of the parties or of the State where the
151. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639(1985). In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the First Circuit Court
of Appeals by upholding an agreement to arbitrate despite the unauthorized raising of an antitrust
issue. Since the United States has accepted the New York Convention in the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, national courts are required to rise above old hostilities towards
arbitration and to "subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring commercial arbitration."
152. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(I); Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(1).
The drafters of the Model Law chose to mirror the New York Convention's use of the word
"only" when deciding on the grounds for refusal of enforcement listed in Article 36. Limited
grounds for appeal may actually make arbitral awards easier to enforce than judicial decisions
where the whole gamut of defenses and legal arguments could be asserted.
153. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(l)(a). Recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may be refused by a competent authority if proof is shown that the parties were
"under law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law
of the country where the award was made." Id.
154. Id. For claims seeking enforcement in the U.S., "[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that,
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The
parties' intentions control as in any contract, but those intentions are generously construed on
issues of arbitrability. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
155. For U.S. citizens, almost any matter, unless expressly prohibited by statute can be
brought to arbitration. For international agreements to arbitrate may allow matters to go to
arbitration that would have required a judicial proceeding had the conflict been purely domestic.
"Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
156. See Martinez, supra note 106, at 498. The Supreme Court has ruled that the validity
of a contract is for the arbitrator to decide. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conldin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395 (1967). It is difficult to think of a case where the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement could be raised on appeal if the court will makes a presumption that the arbitrator was
correct when she ruled on the validity of the contract.
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arbitration took place.'57 As with awards granted under the New York
Convention, incapacity and invalidity defenses have never been success-
ful.' As with most of the refusal provisions of the Model Law, the
language closely parallels that of the New York Convention. This gives an
impression that the drafters of the Model Law wanted to make their law easy
to accept for States already party to the New York Convention.
Refusal to enforce an arbitral award is also extended under the New
York Convention and the Model Law to situations where the party against
whom the award is rendered was not given proper notice of the proceedings
or of the appointment of arbitrators." If a party is unable to present its
case, then enforcement of an arbitral award can also be refused." 0 The
language of the Model Law is identical to that of the New York Convention
on these points.16' The current article seems to be an attempt by the
drafters of the Conventions to guarantee procedural due process for persons
opposing enforcement of an arbitral award. 62 When creating an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal to process claims arising out of the Persian Gulf War, only
claims where both sides have fair opportunity to be heard should be
considered. Successful claimants would then enjoy the benefit of the
enforcement provisions of the Model Law and the New York Conven-
tion. 6
157. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(1)(a)(i). An award may be refused if proof is shown
a party "was under some incapacity; or the said agreement [to arbitrate] is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
the country where the award was made." See New York Convention, supra note 15, art.
V(1)(a).
158. Ungar, supra note 11l, at 746. See ALBERT VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK
ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 277(1981). The incapacity defense has not been invoked before the courts so far. Article
36(l)(a)(i) of the Model Law "has scarcely ever been invoked, and never successfully" to
invalidate an agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 282.
159. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(l)(b). Recognition and enforcement can
be refused upon proof that "[the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present his case." The use of the word "proper" may preserve an incapacity defense.
Martinez, supra note 106, at 499. See U.N. Doc. No. E/CONF. 26/SR.17, at 9, 14 (1958).
"Proper" also helps to guard against improper representation. Ungar, supra note 11, at 747.
160. The inability to present the case should be a physical barrier, not just a choice not to
participate in the proceedings. Some barriers may be inability to obtain a travel visa, force
majeure or other special circumstance. See Ungar, supra note I ll, at 747. See also Martinez,
supra note 106, at 499.
161. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(I)(a)(ii). Once again, the drafters of the Model Law
appear to have made an attempt to make enforcement of international arbitral awards fair and
closely linked to the New York Convention. Those seeking to overturn an arbitral are granted
some degree of procedural fairness. See Ungar, supra note I 1l, at 746.
162. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 16(I)(a)(ii). This appears to be an explicit right to due
process. Since the U.S. Constitution guarantees due process, it is not surprising that an
arbitration convention accepted as law in the United States would guarantee a similar right.
163. This is in slight contrast to the Compensation Commission envisioned in the Secretary's
Report, supra note 1, para. 26, which will be handling claims by making lump-sum payments
to States. "Iraq will be informed of all claims and will have the right to present its comments
to the commissioners within time-delays to be fixed by the Governing Council or the Panel
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Under both the New York Convention and the Model Law, a State may
refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral award if the dispute falls outside
the terms of the parties' agreement to arbitrate." Likewise, a reviewing
court may refuse to enforce decisions that fall outside the scope of the
submission to arbitration." If there are elements of an award that are
enforceable and some that are not, if a part within the contemplation of the
parties is severable, such part may be recognized and enforced." The
courts will invoke this refusal provision only when the arbitrator has clearly
exceeded his authority since a narrow construction most closely comports
with the "enforcement-facilitating thrust of the [New York] Convention."1 67
This provision helps to insure that awards which a party seeks to have
enforced were arrived at in a consensual proceeding." In effect, the court
leaves it to the arbitrator to determine if the subject matter is within the
scope of her authority." Since the proposed claims tribunal will be non-
exclusive and consensual, the parties will be given the opportunity to decide
dealing with the individual claim." Id. The proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel would require
more participation by the individual claimants as the claims relegated to these proceedings would
be, by their nature as exceptional claims, very large and complex.
164. Enforcement may be refused if "[tlhe award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and
enforced." Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(l)(a)(iii); New York Convention, supra note 15,
art. V(l)(c).
165. Id. The parties will be held to their agreement to arbitrate, but an arbitrator cannot
wield more power than the parties are willing to give her. An award on a matter not within the
contemplation of the parties in their submission to arbitrate, may not be enforced by a reviewing
court.
166. Id. Deciding how to separate an award into constituent enforceable and unenforceable
bits, would be a challenge. Neither Convention specifies what law would govern severability
of issues, but one approach might be to look to the law chosen by the parties, or by looking to
the law of the State where the award was made. See Martinez, supra note 106, at 500. The
proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel will require parties to decide on choice of law between them,
or failing that, the arbitrators deciding between them the law that is to apply.
167. Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508
F.2d 969, 976 (1974) [hereinafter RAKTAJ. In RAKTA, the Second Circuit court of appeals
enforced the arbitrators award even though the arbitral award included loss of production costs
which were expressly excluded by the terms of the contract in the section concerning liability
of the parties. The court accepted the arbitrator's interpretation of the terms of the contract
when it is "not apparent" that the scope of the submission to arbitration has been exceeded.
168. See, e.g., Ungar, supra note I 1l, at 748. Model Law, supra note 16, arts. 36(l)(a)(i)
and 36(2)(a)(iii); New York Convention, supra note 15, arts. V(l)(a) and V(I)(c), help to
preserve the consensual nature of the arbitration. Parties can specify from the outset which
dispute between them they wish to submit to arbitration. Perhaps there can be a scenario where
a claimant needs to proceed in one forum for one claim and a different forum for another claim.
This is the effect that would be felt if the reviewing body decided that some part of the
arbitrators decision was within the agreement to arbitrate and some of it was not.
169. See Martinez, supra note 106, at 502-03. At least one U.S. Court has stated that it
preferred not to try to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrators. Fertilizer Corp. of India
v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 960 (S.D. Ohio 1981). Trying to get a court to
reconstruct the agreement to arbitrate on review is "an activity wholly inconsistent with the
deference due arbitral decisions on law and fact." RAKTA, 508 F.2d at 976.
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which matters they would like settled there. The defense that the matter is
outside the scope of submission to arbitration will not likely be raised in a
court reviewing awards of the proposed claims tribunal.
If the arbitral procedure is not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties or the law that they have subjected themselves to, then a court may
refuse to enforce the award." 7  This provision gives the parties to an
arbitration agreement some control over procedure."' The parties are
given the chance to decide how the arbitration should take place and what
the applicable law will be. One reason why this defense is not often raised
stems from the wide discretionary powers that arbitrators have with respect
to the conduct of the arbitral procedure.' " Even minor procedural defi-
ciencies will not prove fatal to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award."r In the proposed claims tribunal, the parties will need to agree in
advance what law will apply for resolving their dispute and choosing
arbitrators. This will circumvent the difficulty of parties attempting to
overturn the award on procedural grounds. A party that consents to a
particular procedure should not be heard to complain of its application when
the dispute settlement procedure he chose reaches an adverse result.
A State may refuse to recognize and enforce an award if the award has
not yet become binding on the parties. 74 If the award is invalid under the
law of the State where the award was made, or a court in that State has set
aside the award, then enforcement may also be refused. 75 Neither the
New York Convention or the Model Law give a clear definition of the word
170. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(I)(d); Model Law, supra note 16, art.
36(l)(a)(iv). The reviewing court may refuse to enforce an arbitral decision if the composition
of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where
the arbitration took place.
171. Some matters in a typical arbitration agreement can be decided between the parties.
What substantive law will be applied? Who will be the arbitrators? Where will the arbitration
be held? What role will the law of the State of arbitration play in settling side issues not easily
resolvable under the law the parties have chosen for substantive issues?
172. Ungar, supra note 11l, at 749. If an arbitrator is given discretion to decide on the
validity of the procedure she uses, it would take egregious behavior on the part of the arbitrator
to have that decision overturned.
173. Martinez, supra note 106, at 504. In Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster
Corporation, 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976), the losing party discovered that the third arbitrator
had direct ties with the winning party, having previously drafted the Civil Code for the Ethiopian
Government. In the agreement to arbitrate, the third arbitrator was to have no direct or indirect
ties to either party. Baruch-Foster raised the V(l)(d) defense in their appeal of the district
court's decision to enforce the award. The court of appeals decided that this was not enough
of a violation of procedure to warrant refusing to enforce the award.
174. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(l)(a)(v); New York Convention, supra note 15, art.
V, § (l)(e). The reviewing body in the State where enforcement is sought may refuse
enforcement if "the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or
suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."
175. Id. The argument that an award that was still on appeal in the State where the award
was rendered should be grounds for stay of enforcement was rejected in Fertilizer Corp. of India
v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
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"binding." 76 A useful interpretation of when an award becomes binding
may be when it is binding under the law of the awarding State.'" Binding
carries with it connotations of both finality and enforceability." ' Even if
an appeal is granted, the party seeking to resist enforcement may be required
to put up a security while their appeal is pending.' A pending appeal
allows, but does not compel, a competent authority to adjourn its deci-
sion.' ° Thus, even an award with an appeal still pending could be
enforced. 'I
The court or competent authority called upon to enforce an arbitral
award may refuse to enforce the award if, under the law of that state, the
176. Martinez, supra note 106, at 505. Perhaps "binding" means that there are no further
arbitral appeals available as suggested in Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 948. The
court did not wish to validate a means by which a losing party could circumvent enforcement
of an arbitral award by commencing a postarbitral action to set the award aside. Id. at 958
(quoting Gerald Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 3 SW. U.L. REV. I, 11 (1971)).
177. See Ungar, supra note 111, at 749. The final decision to suspend or enforce an award
will end up being made on a case by case basis by the reviewing court, with the pro-enforcement
attitude of the New York Convention. Fertilizer Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 961. See,
e.g., Martinez, supra note 106, at 505-06.
178. Martinez, supra note 106, at 505. "Final" implies completion of all appeals.
"Enforceable" implies that a court action will be required because the arbitral award is not self-
executing. Perhaps to avoid the ambiguity of the words "final and enforceable" the drafters of
the New York Convention used the word binding. Both the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses of 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157, and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign
Arbitral Awards of 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301, were superseded by the New York Convention to
the extent that parties to those Conventions became bound to the New York Convention. This
meant that a pending appeal could no longer block enforcement of an arbitral award.
179. "If the application for setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a
competent authority referred to in article V(l)(e), the authority before which the award is sought
to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the
award and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order
the other party to give suitable security." New York Convention, supra note 15, art. VI. Model
Law, supra note 16, art. 36(2) provides almost the same language, except that it references "the
court where recognition and enforcement is sought" rather than the "authority before which the
award is sought to be relied upon."
180. Martinez, supra note 106, at 506. The fact that a party still has access to a court of law
does not prevent that award from taking on a binding quality. This creates a situation where a
court in one State is holding an enforcement proceeding while a judicial appeal is conducted in
a second State. The problem of a double exequatur-two or more authorizations to enforce an
award-quickly gets raised. See generally, Michael H. Strub, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards Under Article V(l)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal
for Effective Guidelines, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (1990). For the current claims settlement
concerns, making the verification document difficult to forge and requiring accurate mailing
addresses of claimants would go far to insuring that most valid claimants would have only one
chance to enforce. Making all claimants register by a certain date after which no more claims
can be filed also helps control the double exequatur problem.
181. This should not be an issue in the proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel since the only court
proceedings conducted will be in the States where Iraqi foreign assets are being attached. It is
expeditious to the claims process for Iraq to maintain a regular payment plan and schedule for
claimants to receive fund. A large-scale multinational arbitral tribunal to settle war claims will
need at least a minimal due process standard for appeals.
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subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration."n
If the dispute could not have been settled by arbitration under domestic law
of the enforcing State, the court may refuse to enforce the award of a foreign
arbitral panel on its own accord.1' 3 Courts have liberally construed this
clause, holding that doubts about the arbitrability of claims should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.'" U.S. courts have adopted a policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements if they are reasonable under the circum-
stances of the dispute.'" Reflected in court decisions is a strong concern
for the effectivenes of commercial arbitration and a desire to break down "a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts.""s If the arbitrability of a claim is called into question, a court
in the United States should favor agreement to arbitrate in a close case.
The catchall clause of the New York Convention and the Model Law
allows a court or competent authority to refuse recognition and enforcement
of an award on public policy grounds.187 U.S. courts again have chosen
to limit the effectiveness of this clause by restricting its use to a situation
182. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 36(l)(b)(i); The New York Convention, supra note 15,
art. V(2)(a). The court or competent authority called upon to enforce the award can raise the
current defense on its own motion.
183. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(2)(a). This defense was successfully raised
to deny enforcement of an arbitral award in Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated without op., 684
F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter LIAMCO]. Libya nationalized LIAMCO's rights to
petroleum concessions in 1973-1974, that had been granted in the 1950's. Dissatisfied with the
compensation it received for its interests and equipment, LIAMCO succeeded in convincing a
Geneva arbitrator to render an award in its favor and then sought to enforce the award in the
United States. The District Court decided that it could not have ordered arbitration since to do
so would have violated the Act of State doctrine. Id. at 1178-79. Nationalization laws had
abrogated all terms of the concession agreement and the arbitrator would not be the competent
authority to review the validity of the nationalization. Id. at 1179. Before the appeal was
decided, the parties settled. LIAMCO, 684 F.2d at 1032. Considering the pro-arbitration
posture of the courts today, this agreement to arbitrate would probably be upheld if the case was
retried. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 106, at 507-08.
184. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985).
In Mitsubishi, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arbitral award based on an antitrust violation.
Antitrust had traditionally been an issue solely for the courts due to strong public policy
concerns, and treble damages were only awardable by the courts. The Court concluded that
.concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability
in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties agreement, even assuming that
a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context." Id.
185. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (stating that "an agreement to
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum selection clause that
posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.") See,
e.g., Pietrowski, supra note 10, at 70.
186. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
9 (1972) ("[wie cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.")).
187. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. V(2)(b); Model Law, supra note 16, art.
36(b)(ii). This defense, like the New York Convention, art. V(2)(a) and the Model Law, art.
36(b)(i), can be raised by one of the parties, by the court or by another competent authority in
the State where enforcement is sought.
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where "enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic notions of
morality and justice."'"" At least one U.S. court has held that a manifest
disregard for the law would need to rise above some level of contravening
public policy in order for refusal to enforce to be justified.'" The courts
of the United States are reluctant to overturn a decision on public policy
grounds." g  Allowing arbitral awards to be effective except in extreme
circumstances protects the integrity of the enforcement provisions of the New
York Convention and the Model Law.'9 '
The above discussion demonstrates that international enforcement
mechanisms are available to successful claimants and that the mechanism is
available to limit the grounds for appeal of validity rendered arbitral awards.
However, there is nothing to enforce if a competent authority has yet to
make a decision. The Governing Council will be able to handle some
claims, but some exceptional and pre-invasion claims will need a different
procedure. The most successful recent example of an ad hoc international
arbitral forum is the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. A discussion of that panel's
structure and how it can be used as a model for an Iraq-World Claims
Tribunal, now follows.
V. MODELING AN IRAQ-WORLD ARBITRAL PANEL AFTER
THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
When the United States was involved in the hostage crisis with Iran in
the late 70's and early 80's, it brought about a disruption of business between
the two States that resulted in disputes between the nationals of one state and
the government of the other. Algeria was called on, as a neutral third state,
188. RAKTA, 508 F.2d 969, 973-749 (1974). "To read the public policy defense as a
parochial device protective of national political interests would seriously undermine the
Convention's utility." Id. at 974. The United States in acceding to the New York Convention
must have meant to subscribe to the supranational emphasis of the Convention's framers. Id.
(citing Scherk, 417 U.S. at 506).
189. Brandeis Intsel Ltd. v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 656 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention:
Practice in U.S. Courts, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RECENT DEvELOP-
MENTS 275, 290-96 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Robert B. von Mehren Chairmen eds., 1988).
Perhaps fraud or duress could be successfully asserted as public policy grounds for refusing to
enforce an arbitral award. See Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp.
352, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that "[aigreements exacted by duress contravene the public
policy of the nation .... and accordingly, duress, if established, furnishes a basis for refusing
enforcement of an award under Article V(b)(2) [sic] of the Convention.").
190. McLaughlin, supra note 189, at 288. In RAKTA, 508 F.2d at 973, the second circuit
held that "the general pro-enforcement bias informing the Convention .. . points toward a
narrow reading of the public policy defense. An expansive construction of this defense would
vitiate the Convention's basic effort to remove pre-existing obstacles to enforcement."
191. In order for the proposed arbitral panel to be effective, it would need to avail itself of
the enforcement power of the New York Convention and the Model Law. There already is a
strong public policy reason to hold Iraq accountable for claims arising out of the Persian Gulf
War. This policy was expressed in the several U.N. Resolutions calling for Iraq to accept its
responsibilities under international law. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Res. 674, para. 8, U.N. SCOR,
Oct. 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1560 (1990).
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to create the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to provide a forum for claimants to
air these disputes." The general principle of the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal
was to terminate all litigation between the Government of each party and the
nationals of the other." The purpose of the tribunal was to terminate all
legal proceedings between the United States and Iran in their respective
national courts and to settle their claims through binding arbitration.'4 A
further clause provided that once the hostages were released, the United
States agreed to drop its suit that was pending in the International Court of
Justice, and to bar the prosecution of any claim of the United States or her
nationals for a claim arising before the effective date of the Algerian
proposal.I" In its first ten years, the Tribunal handled nearly 4,000
cases. 19
Under the Algerian proposal, all judgments that were resolved in a
United States court which called for the transfer of property or assets to Iran
were guaranteed-at least to the extent the property or assets could be found
192. Iran-United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981). "The
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, having been requested by the
Governments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America to serve as an
intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable resolution of the crisis in their relations arising
out of the detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran." Id. at 224. The Tribunal was
unique when it was created and has been "described as the most significant arbitral body in
history." See, e.g., John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 278, 279 (1989) (citing Richard B. Lillich, THE
IRAN UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL-1981-1983 preface (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1984)).
193. "It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions
of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,
to terminate all litigations between the Government of each party and the nationals of the other,
and to bring about the settlement and termination of all such claims through binding arbitration."
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, General
Principle B, 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981) [hereinafter Algerian Declaration].
194. Id. "ITihe United States agrees to tenninate all legal procedins in the United States
courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state
enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further
litigation based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such claims through
binding arbitration."
195. Id. Point !1, at 227. When the hostages were confirmed released, the United States
agreed to promptly withdraw all claims "pending against Iran before the International Court of
Justice and will thereafter bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or future
claim of the United States or a United States national arising out of the events occurring before
the date of this declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States nationals on
November 4, 1979, (B) their subsequent detention, (C) injury to United States property or
property of the United States nationals within the United States Embassy compound in Tehran
after November 3, 1979, and (D) injury to the United States nationals or their property as a
result of popular movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran which were not an
act of the Government of Iran."
196. Crook, supra note 192, at 280. By the end of 1988, the Tribunal had addressed 542
large claims brought by U.S. or Iranian nationals against the other Government; 421 claims
brought by Iranian and U.S. banks; 2,795 small claims for amounts less than $250,000; 23 cases
interpreting the Algiers Accords or verifying compliance (A cases); and 74 intergovernmental
claims under contracts (B cases). Id.
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in the United States.'97 The payment of other claims would come from a
special escrow account created to hold the funds payable to successful
claimants.' 98 Getting funds to a neutral third party through the creation of
an escrow account is a good way to insure that the funds will be distributed
on schedule."
In order to get the funds to a neutral place from which to distribute
them, the United States with the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) acting as fiscal
agent, signed an escrow agreement with Iran, with the Bank Markazi acting
as an interested party.' The Banque Centrale d'Algerie acted as the
escrow agent."' The escrow agreement first had the FED liquidate at
market price, all Iranian owned and seized U.S. Government Securities.'
The FED deposited the proceeds from the liquidation, in addition to any
other securities and gold bullion, in the Bank of England.' A list of all
information necessary to identify the Iranian property was sent to the Banque
197. Algerian Declaration, supra note 193, Point 15 at 228. "As to any judgment of a U.S.
court which calls for the transfer of any property or assets to Iran, the United States hereby
guarantees the enforcement of the final judgment to the extent that the property or assets exist
within the United States." The proposed claims Iraq-World arbitral will also seek to use some
frozen foreign assets to satisfy some claimants, especially where the particular asset is logically
linked with a particular claim, and where a money judgment would not satisfy the claimant.
198. Id. Escrow Agreement, 20 I.L.M. 234. "This Agreement is made to implement the
relevant provisions of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19, 1981 (the
"Declaration"). These provisions concern the establishment of escrow arrangements for Iranian
property tied to the release of United States nationals being held in Iran."
199. The Algerian escrow account is a useful model for an escrow account used to hold funds
to pay awards rendered against Iraq. The Secretary General may have had this in mind when
he drafted paragraph 3 of the Secretary's Report, supra note I, which established a special
account known as the United Nations Compensation Fund. A security and enforcement
precaution was added by specifically mentioning that the fund would enjoy the "status, facilities,
privileges, and immunities accorded to the United Nations" as bestowed by art. 105 of the U.N.
Charter.
200. Escrow Agreement, supra note 198, at 234. Like all other international agreements the
importance of getting a written agreement cannot be understated. The writing is the first place
a reviewing body will look to interpret the agreement of the parties. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 139, art. 31(1): "General rule of interpretation-I. A treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
201. Escrow Agreement, supra note 198, at 234.
202. Id. at 234-25, Operative para. 1(A). The Government of the United States caused the
FED to "[s]ell, at a price which is the average for the middle of the market, bid and ask prices
for the three business days prior to the sale, all U.S. Government securities in its custody or
control as of the date of the sale, which are owned by the Government of Iran, or its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities." This was triggered by the release of the 52 American
nationals. Id. at 237.
203. Id. Operative para. l(B), 20 I.L.M. 234-35. The U.S. Government was required to
cause the FED to "transfer to the Bank of England as depositary for credit to accounts on its
books in the name of the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, as Escrow Agent under this Agreement,
all ecurities (other than the aforementioned U.S. Government securities), funds (including the
proceeds of the aforementioned U.S. Government securities), and gold bullion .. .which are
in the custody or control of the FED and owned by the Government of Iran, or its agencies,
instrumentalities or controlled entities as of the date of such transfer." Id.
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Centrale d'Algerie." All other funds identifiable to Iranians found in the
control of the United States or its nationals were likewise made part of the
deposit with the Bank of England in the name of Banque Centrale
d'Algerie.33  The Bank of England initially transferred funds to the escrow
account to bring the balance to $1 billion.' Incremental deposits were
made by Iran if the fund dropped below $500 million." Eventually, the
N.V. Settlement Bank of the Netherlands became the place where the account
was kept." The fund acts as an intermediary between the parties in the
transfer of arbitral award funds much like any other escrow account would
transfer funds.
A similar escrow arrangement could be set up through a network of
international banking institutions paying Iraqi frozen assets into a centralized
account. This centralized account, containing funds not specifically
earmarked for use by the Commission, could be used to fund an Iraq-World
arbitral panel charged with the duty of processing exceptional and pre-
invasion claims.' The Algerian proposal wisely ensured that settlement
funds were available by providing specifically that "the expenses of the
Tribunal shall be borne equally by the two governments." 2'0 It would
204. Id. at 235. Some suggested information to be included in materials were the type of
property, the source of its origin, and the character of the property (principal or interest).
205. Id. at 235-36. The Escrow Agreement called for the United States Government to
.cause Iranian deposits and securities in domestic branches and offices of the United States
banks, Iranian deposits and securities in domestic branches and offices of United States banks,
and other Iranian assets (meaning funds or securities) held by persons or institutions subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, to be transferred to the FED." Id. The FED in turn
transferred this Iranian property to the Bank of England for credit to the Escrow Account.
206. Algerian Declaration, supra note 193, paras. 6-7. A special interest-bearing security
account received Iranian funds until it reached SI billion after which all incoming funds would
be transferred to Iran. All funds in the security account were to be used "for the sole purpose
of securing the payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the claims
settlement agreement." See David P. Stewart & Laura B. Sherman, Developments at the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, in THE IRAN UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL- 1981-1983,
1, 5 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1984).
207. Algerian Declaration, supra note 193, par. 7. "Whenever the Central Bank shall
thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the security account has fallen below $500 million, Iran
shall promptly make new deposits sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 million in
the account." Id. The account was to be so maintained until the President of the Arbitral
Tribunal certified to the Algerian Bank that all arbitral awards have been satisfied.
208. See Stewart & Sherman, supra note 206, at 5.
209. By forcing claimants to put up a bond against entirely frivolous claims, and drawing
generally from the pool of available foreign frozen assets and incoming Iraqi award funds, the
proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel could find the funding necessary to begin processing claims.
States and nationals bringing claims may initially be called upon to pay a filing fee which could
be put towards administrative expenses. Under the Secretary General's proposal, the expenses
of the Commission should be paid from the Compensation Fund. Secretary's Report, supra note
1, para. 29. Perhaps the proposed Iraq-World panel could petition the United Nations for
support from the Compensation Fund on a showing to the validity of the procedure. Perhaps
the proposed Panel could submit consolidated claims of individuals that were successful in that
procedure to the Compensation Commission on those individual's behalf.
210. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 29 I.L.M. 230, art. VI(3) (1981).
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seem to lend legitimacy to a claims tribunal if funds are clearly identified at
the beginning of the arbitration and if these funds are in the control of a
neutral third party. 11
The claimants against Iran were required to drop their individual claims
and submit to binding arbitration. The authority of the President to enter
into an agreement for all claimants was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Dames & Moore v. Regan.212 Dames and Moore were required to drop
their pursuit of judicial remedies and bring their claim before the Tribunal
pursuant to an executive order.1 3 Dames and Moore's argument that the
forum requirement constituted a taking failed.2 4 This taking difficulty
should not manifest itself in the settlement of the current conflict since all
currently proposed procedures are non-exclusive of each other.1 5
In order for the proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel to be successful,
governments and their nationals would need to voluntarily submit their claims
to binding arbitration. Since proceeding in two forums simultaneously would
be just the sort of redundancy that a claims tribunal would hope to circum-
vent, individual claimants would have to trust the power of the tribunal and
drop any pending court action they may have brought. For this reason, it
would be beneficial for gaining the trust of claimants to link the tribunal with
a body of law such as the New York Convention or the Model Law with
211. There probably would be difficulty finding a neutral to the current conflict. A perennial
neutral-such as Switzerland or The Netherlands-may need to open escrow accounts from
which funds will be distributed to successful claimants.
212. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision to confirm the United
States President's authority to enter into a binding, exclusive arbitration agreement, the Supreme
Court considered the interplay between Congress and the President. The Court considered in
its analysis, "all the circumstances which might shed light on the views of the Legislative Branch
toward the action, including congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence." Id. at 668-69.
213. In Exec, Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. § 457 (1980), President Carter declared a national
emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill). This action blocked the removal or transfer of "all
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled
entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662-63. The Supreme Court upheld the validity
of an OFAC regulation providing that "[ulnless licensed or authorized . . .any attachment,judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is null and void with
respect to any property in which on or since [November 14, 1979] there existed an interest of
Iran." 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980). See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662-63.
214. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674. The court ruled that since the attachments and the
transfer of assets was taken pursuant to congressional authorization, it was "supported by the
strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." (quoting Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)).
215. It would be an interesting question of law and fact if all claimants against Iraq were
forced to pursue one procedure rather than the choice they currently enjoy. Consider United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). The Court, in recognizing that the President does have
some power to enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent of
Congress, held that power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settlement of claims
of our nationals certainly is a modest implied power of the President. No obstacle can be placed
in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this country and another nation, unless the
historic conception of the powers and responsibilities is to be drastically revised. See also
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 683.
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their established enforcement provisions. This could be accomplished by
specifically mentioning the applicable laws in the agreement to arbitrate.
21 6
Another alternative is to mention that all cases will be decided and enforced
with respect for international law as the claims tribunal determines to be
applicable. 217 A provision stating that treaties in force are applicable to the
current agreement to arbitrate, would bring added enforcement protection at
least to the signatory States of arbitral conventions. Thus, even if certain
governments were willing to cheat on the payments to an escrow fund, those
parties wishing to attach Iraqi foreign assets in a particular country would
have a second chance to gain control of those assets through a court
proceeding in that State. 2 8
Even though not specifically mentioned, the New York Convention
applies to decisions rendered by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. In Ministry
of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc. [Gould], the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the New York Convention would apply
to those seeking to enforce awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in courts
of the United States.2 9 The basic requirement for jurisdiction was held to
be that the award arose "out of a legal relationship.. .which is commercial in
nature and ... which is not entirely domestic in scope."'2 The Algiers
Accords served as the writing required by the New York Convention to
216. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981) [hereinafter Claims
Settlement Agreement]. Article 111(2) states that "the Tribunal shall conduct its business in
accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that
this agreement can be carried out." The agreement to arbitrate claims in the current situation
should follow this example set by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
217. Id. art. V states "the Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect for law,
applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and international law as the
Tribunal determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of the trade, contract
provisions and changed circumstances." Such a broad clause can be read to give courts wide
discretion to use whatever treaties in force between States that speak to the issue of enforcement.
218. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. III; Model Law, supra note 16, art. 6. There
is a good possibility of cheating by parties sympathetic to Iraq, but a thorough discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this note. One premise that this Comment is founded on is that the
U.N. Security Council has the force behind its words to pressure enough countries to comply
with the Compensation Commission in accomplishing its mandate to control Iraqi foreign assets
and oil exports to the extent that claims will be paid.
219. Ministry of Defense of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould Inc., 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990). The Ministry of Defense sought to enforce an
award rendered by the Iran-U. S. claims tribunal against Gould in the courts of the United States.
Gould raised several defenses including lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal courts and
that the New York Convention did not apply to the enforcement of Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
Awards. The Circuit Court upheld the District Court's finding that they did have the subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce an award of the Tribunal under the Federal Arbitration Act (9
U.S.C. § 201-208). They also found that the requirements of the New York Convention had
been satisfied which guaranteed enforcement of the award in the U.S. See David J. Bederman,
Jurisdiction-] 958 New York Convention- enforcement of award by Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
in United States courts, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1990).
220. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1362.
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evidence the consent of the parties to have their award enforced." The
writing that Iraq signs to initiate proceedings should make mention of both
the New York Convention and the Model Law in order to remove all doubt
about the binding quality of the awards and the consent of the parties to
enforcement of the awards wherever assets can be attached.
Gould argued that an award rendered by an essentially anational arbitral
tribunal could not be enforced under the New York Convention. ' Gould
relied on the refusal provision which allows a court to not enforce an award
that "has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
laws of which, that award was made."' The court agreed with Gould that
this defense could not be raised in challenge to an anational award, but still
ruled that the New York Convention would apply to the enforcement of the
award.' The court ruled that this result was consistent with the purpose
of the New York Convention which allows parties to "untether" themselves
from any particular national law.' Likewise, when parties enter into an
agreement to arbitrate their claims before the Iraq-World arbitral panel, the
award will be anational. Perhaps reluctant parties would be willing to submit
to binding arbitration if they felt that there was a good chance of actually
receiving payment if they won. The precedent of Gould shows that such
awards should be enforceable through the New York Convention. '
Another relevant provision of the Algerian proposal actually established
the "International Arbitral Tribunal" for the purposes of settling the claims
of the nationals of Iran and the United States against their opposite govern-
221. Id. at 1363. The court recognized President Carter's authority to enter into international
claims settlement proceedings and his power to conclude such agreements on behalf of U.S.
citizens. See, e.g., Bederman, supra note 219, at 558. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981), the Supreme Court decided that the suspension of private proceedings by the
President in favor of exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitral panel did not constitute a taking. The
proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel is non-exclusive and is to be used in conjunction with
established claims settlement and enforcement law.
222. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1364. The court saw the Tribunal's award as "a creature of
international law, and not national law," thus not affiliating the award with the law of any one
legal system in particular. The Iran-U.S. awards were anational and arose out of the bilateral
agreement between the parties. It will be a multi-lateral agreement that would form the Iraq-
World arbitral panel but that should not effect the award's anational character.
223. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 5(1)(e). The argument is that if Gould was
precluded from raising this defense due to the anational nature of the awards of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, the Convention could not apply. To do so would deprive the parties of this
defense and to act contrary to the intent of the drafters of the New York Convention. See
Bederman, supra note 219, at 558.
224. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1365. See also Bedennan, supra note 219, at 558.
225. Gould, 887 F.2d at 1364-65. See also Bederman, supra note 219, at 558. Gould was
certainly not precluded from raising any of the other refusal defenses in challenge to an anational
award. For instance, Gould was allowed to raise procedural fairness issues.
226. Many arbitration agreements are established without reference to a particular national
law. The Gould decision demonstrates that awards emanating from such an agreement are not,
by their nature, defective. Of course, enforcement works both ways. Iraq may use the New
York Convention or the Model Law to enforce arbitral awards that are rendered in her or her
nationals favor. See Bederman, supra note 219, at 560.
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mental counter part.22" The Algerian proposal added that the claims
settlement tribunal would be the forum for all counterclaims which arose out
of the "same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject
matter of that national's claim." 2  The arbitral tribunal was also empow-
ered to have jurisdiction over all official claims of the United States and Iran
that the brought against each other arising out of their contractual arrange-
ments. The proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel should be given the
jurisdiction to decide what claims it is competent to hear.'
The arbitrators of the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal were given discretion to
make choice of law decisions. The Algiers Accords provided for choice of
law stating that "[t]he Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of respect
for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles of commercial and
international law as the Tribunal determines to be applicable.""1  This
language left the arbitrators free to select rules of substantive law through
whatever processes and from whatever sources that they deemed fit.'
Like the Algerian Settlement Agreement, some reference should be made to
the Model Law in forming an agreement to arbitrate. 3 A catch-all choice
of law language, present in the Model Law states that if the parties do not
agree on the law to be used, the "Tribunal shall apply the law determined by
the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable." 2' The arbitrators
227. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 216, art. 11(1), 20 I.L.M. at 230-31. "An
International Arbitral Tribunal (] is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of
nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United
States." Id.
228. Id. art. 11(1). Claims and counter-claims, whether or not filed by January 19, 1981,
were under the jurisdiction of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
also had the jurisdiction to decide whether or not it has jurisdiction over an action. Id. art.
11(3).
229. Id. art. 11(2). "The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official claims of the
United States and Iran against each other arising out of contractual arrangements between them
for the purchase and sale of goods and services." Id.
230. All manner of international, commercial disputes should be arbitrable in the proposed
Iraq-World arbitral panel. This way, unforseen claims will not be foreclosed from having an
arbitral panel capable of hearing them.
231. Claim Settlement Declaration, supra note 216, art. V. The article mentions specifically
that "relevant usages of trade, contract provisions, and changed circumstances" should be
considered.
232. Crook, supra note 192, at 282. The formula for Iraq to choose applicable law does not
mention any specific conflict of law rules to follow. It seems the Tribunal is free to select the
rules of substantive law that applies.
233. Claim Settlement Declaration, supra note 216, art. 111(2). "Members of the Tribunal
shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration
rules of... UNCITRAL except to the extent modified by the parties or by the Tribunal to
ensure that this agreement can be carried out." Secretary's Report, supra note 1, art. 27. The
commissioners will be guided by the Governing Council and the UNCITRAL Rules.
234. Model Law, supra note 16, art. 28(2). Article 28(1) states that "the arbitral tribunal
shall decide the dispute in accordance with such rules of law as are chosen by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute. Any designation of the law or legal system of a given
State shall be construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law
of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules." Article 28(3) provides that cases can be
decided ex aequo et bono if the parties authorize it. The parties in the proposed claims
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in the evolving Iraq-World process should be given a free hand to decide the
law appropriate for any given conflict they are resolving."
Signing an agreement to arbitrate evidenced the consent of the parties
to have their claims finally settled by the Iran-U.S. arbitral panel.' Both
sets of arbitral rules which have been examined here, require some form of
consent of the parties in order for the award to be binding. 7  Since Iraq
has recognized its responsibility to pay war reparations,238 it probably
would be willing to arbitrate some of the claims against it.?3 At least, in
arbitration, the parties retain more than a modicum of control over the fate
of their claim.' For the proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel to be effec-
tive, Iraq and the parties opposing Iraq, would have to explicitly evidence
consent.
The Algerian Declaration wrought enforcement provisions directly into
the agreement to arbitrate. All decisions and awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal were declared "final and binding."41  The agreement further
provided that "[any award which the arbitral Tribunal may render against
either government shall be enforceable against such government in the courts
of any nation in accordance with its laws." '2 The agreement provided the
mechanism for claimants on either side to enforce their award in any way
available under international law. The Iraq-World arbitral panel should
contain provisions which give it a quality of independent enforceability-that
is enforceability on its own terms.
settlement procedure should be given some ability to influence what law will be used, but the
ultimate discretion should be left with the arbitrators of the particular claim.
235. The number of possible claimants that will demand damages against Iraq makes it
impossible to predetermine exactly what law will be applied for all scenarios. A flexible choice
of law clause is an essential element in an agreement that processes such a wide range of claims
from claimants of such varied backgrounds.
236. U.S. Authorization to Approve Text of Documents relating to the Release of the
Hostages, 29 I.L.M. 223 (1981). This cover sheet to the settlement of the hostage crisis
evidenced the consent of the parties to execute the Agreements set out by the Algiers Accords.
237. New York Convention, supra note 15, art. 11(1); Model Law, supra note 16, art. I(1).
238. Gerald, supra note 77. Secretary's Report, supra note I, para. 16, mentions that Iraq
has accepted Resolution 687 signifying their acknowledgement of obligation to claimants against
them. Iraq, though they have requested a five year grace period before being obligated to
commence reparations, have signified a willingness to contribute some percentage of oil exports
to the Fund in order to settle claims.
239. Exceptional claims are defined as claims that are for large amounts of money. A rational
pt would not allow an exceptional claim be uncontested if there is an arguable question ofliblty.
240. There is control of the selection of arbitrators, but there is no control of the laws used
and not used. Thus, a claimant has a chance to appear in front of a supposedly neutral body
instead of being prosecuted in the courts of another State.
241. Claims Settlement Agreement, supra note 216, art. IV(I). The Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal was an exclusive procedure. The policy behind finalizing the claims prompted the
parties to give the Tribunal enough power to carry out its mandate.
242. Id. art. IV(3). This certainly leaves the door open to enforcement through use of the
New York Convention or the Model Law. If the place where enforcement was sought had taken
the reciprocity reservation, it would be no obstacle since the Netherlands was the place of
Arbitration for the lran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
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An early challenge to the Arbitrators of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
was encountered in the area of case management due to the sheer number of
claims.' Claims were pooled into general categories according to general
legal issues and the type of loss claimed." Pooling of claims allowed the
Tribunal to select certain claims for a full hearing.4 5 Based on these
decisions, the remaining small claims could be arbitrated expeditiously by
category.' This approach is similar to the approach that the Secretary-
General has suggested to process small claims.4 7 Most of the claims
arising out of the Persian Gulf War will be of a type that the Commission
will be able to handle.' These smaller claims will generally not fit into
the exceptional claims category-failing on either the complexity or value
aspect. The proposed Iraq-World arbitral panel could begin processing
exceptional claims immediately. This could add up to saving years for some
claimants.' Considering that the small claims are the ones that have taken
the longest to settle in the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, it may actually be
advantageous for some exceptional claimants to divorce their claim from the
Commission.'
243. Stewart & Sherman, supra note 206, at 12-13. The United states filed 2,795 claims of
less than $250,000 on behalf of its nationals. This led to the hiring of more staff at the U.S.
Claims Tribunal. The proposed claims panel would need to find a competent staff to organize
claims as a threshold to processing any such claims.
244. Id. See United States Government Proposal for expedited Treatment of Claims of U.S.
Nationals for Under $250,000 Each (June 14, 1983) (available at Department of State). There
are twelve categories: (I) medical and educational expenses of Iranians in the U.S.; (2) breach
of commercial contract or non-payment of commercial debt by Iran; (3) breach of commercial
contract by a non-governmental Iranian entity; (4) breach of commercial contract by both
governrnental and non-governmental entities of Iran; (5) nonpayment of private debt; (6)
expropriation of real property; (7) interference with use of bank accounts; (8) loss of personal
property; (9) damages to business as a result of the acts of Iran; (10) salary claims where
claimant was employed by and in Iran; (11) salary claims where claimant was employed by a
U.S. company in Iran; and (12) miscellaneous.
245. Stewart & Sherman, supra note 206, at 13. Once small claims were categorized
according to legal issues, processing one of a type of claim could allow an arbitrator to make
inferences about other similar claims. This is consistent with a procedure that makes lump-sum
settlements to States.
246. Id. This assumes that the parties entering into the arbitration agreement are willing to
give precedential value to early decisions. The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions are largely
unpublished and stare decisis does not apply. The claims panel is suggested to have arbitrators
write their decisions and cite sources of law including previous arbitral tribunal decisions.
247. Secretary's Report, supra note 1. The Tribunal was empowered to hear individual
claims though, while the Governing Council will hear only the aggregated claims of States. See
Essaye & Turza, supra note 3. Perhaps the aggregating approach will help the Governing
Council to avoid some of the delays that the Tribunal has experienced.
248. See e.g., Essaye & Turza, supra note 3. It makes sense that the structure proposed by
the Secretary General would be one which could process a majority of the claims against Iraq.
249. Many exceptional claims would have to wait until urgent claims were processed by the
Compensation Commission. These non-urgent exceptional claims have a low priority as far as
the compensation proceedings are concerned. The total time for payment of claims could be 30
years away. See, e.g., Whaling, supra note 45, at 328.
250. See, e.g., Crook, supra note 192, at 280. Over 2,500 of the original 2,795 small
claims are left to be decided. This compares to 743 out of 963 large claims and bank claims that
have already been settled. Id.
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Besides case management, other ground rules will need to be set for the
processing of claims. Certain procedural issues will manifest themselves
before any claims will reach the enforcement stage. Choosing arbitrators
will be an initial challenge. The arbitrators that begin the Tribunal will have
a major influence on not just the claims they process but of future claimants
who try to use the early decisions for their precedential value. The
arbitrators will need to be dedicated for what will be a long odyssey into a
wide variety of legal issues.
CONCLUSION
The enforcement mechanism is available to the nation that can get Iraq
to consent to the jurisdiction of an arbitral panel and win. The New York
Convention and the Model Law have been recognized by the United Nations
and some of its Member States as valid enforcement tools. Though some
reservations and defenses surround these conventions, they have been upheld
in the United States and in other States. The biggest problems will be getting
to a proper forum and finding the money to pay the claimants.
Iraq will sell many barrels of oil over the next few decades to replenish
an escrow fund established to pay claimants against it, money will be
available. The proper forum for some claims will be with the Commission
established by the Security Council and the Secretary-General. Some
exceptional and pre-invasion claims will need to be processed another way.
The proposed arbitral similar to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal is not only a
viable option, but a rare legal opportunity. If it takes thirty years to process
and pay all the claims arising out of the Persian Gulf War, some entire legal
careers may be spent working on this same scenario. Right now, the
literature only guesses how the claims will be processed. It will be
interesting to see how the claims procedure evolves.
It is important to set the right course for the claims process, else
procedural issues may bog down the progress of claims settlement. The Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal serves as a good, but not perfect, model to base the
Iraq-World arbitral panel. Some shortcomings of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal will be overcome simply because of the range of countries involved
in the proceedings. All countries will have an incentive to make sure that
Iraq complies with the mandate of the Security Council. Also, Iraq has
consented in principle to a duty to pay for the damage that it has inflicted on
States and their nationals. With these hurdles behind, it is time to get an
agreement signed and begin the slow healing process. 51
251. Iraqi oil exports have not yet returned to pre-war levels and the claims process is
slowgoing. The Security Council mandated the destruction of chemical weapons and the
destruction of the tools necessary to create nuclear weapons in Iraq. U.N. S.C. Res. 687, U.N.
SCOR, Apr. 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991). Iraq has not complied. Human rights violations
against the Kurds are still ongoing in violation of U.N. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, Apr. 5,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 860 (1991). Both of these factors have slowed the claims process.
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This comment is devoted to showing that the healing process could be
facilitated by the protection that the U.N. has seen fit to adopt in various
recognition and enforcement conventions. The awards of an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal would be recognized and enforced if those awards satisfy the
requirements of the New York Convention or the Model Law. These
conventions should be used by the United Nations, and the States it
represents, to assure individual claimants that they will eventually be paid
and to trust the procedure. In this way, exceptional claims outside the scope
of the Commission can have an forum in which to proceed. Of course, some
claimants falling outside the jurisdiction of all proposed claims tribunals will
need to keep forum shopping. Fortunately, the U.N. recognized enforcement
conventions will follow the claimant everywhere.
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